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ABSTRACT
This dissertation introduces three essays on health and public economics. In the first
essay, I reexamine how false ID laws with scanner provisions affect underage drinking.
Yoruk uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 and finds that false
ID laws with scanner provisions have large impacts on underage drinking. I first demon-
strate that analyses based on NLSY97 data fail falsification exercises testing for significant
pre-intervention effects, and that the estimated effects based on these data are highly sen-
sitive to the inclusion of a lead term and to sample selection, which weakens confidence
in the large estimated effects reported in the previous literature. I then use data from the
Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System for the analysis and show that estimates based
on these data indicate that these policies have no effect on underage drinking behavior.
In the second essay, I take advantage of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure pro-
cess to analyze the effect of government spending on local economic conditions. Exploit-
ing variation in the timing and amount of construction funding provided across counties,
my analyses yield an estimated cost per job of $65,000 per year and a local fiscal multi-
plier of 1.21. Analyses of neighboring counties show little evidence of spillover effects.
To further explore the mechanisms underlying these results, I investigate the effects of
government spending on migration and show that the funding has positive effects on in-
migration, but these effects are too small to explain the main results.
In the final essay, we examine how childbearing responds to changes in economic con-
ditions. We exploit variation driven by the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure process,
in which $25 billion of construction funding was distributed across the United States in
different amounts and at different points in time. We show that this stimulus improved
men’s—but not women’s—economic conditions, providing a rare opportunity to assess
ii
different theoretical models of childbearing. We find that the stimulus led to significant
increases in birth rates. These results are consistent with models in which child quantity
is a normal good and women’s foregone earnings are a major component of the costs of
having children.
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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The main focus of my doctoral research is to apply causal inference technique to iden-
tify the effects of important public policies on measures of social wellbeing. Particularly,
policy changes are employed as quasi-experiments to identify the health and social impacts
of interventions.
In the first essay, I reexamine the effects of the false ID laws with scanner provisions
on underage drinking. Recently, several states have passed false ID laws with scanner
provisions (hereafter, FSP laws): these laws incentivize alcohol retailers and bar owners
to use electronic scanners to ensure that customers are at least 21 years old and have valid
identification.1 The estimates reported in Yoruk (2014) suggest that the adoption of FSP
laws significantly reduces youth alcohol use. Moreover, the magnitude of those estimates
suggests that FSP laws are extremely effective compared to other alcohol control policies.
These laws have the potential to reduce alcohol sales to youth through two channels. First,
there may be a detection effect because an electronic scanner makes it easier to detect
fake identification used to purchase alcohol. Second, there may be a deterrence effect as
scanners may deter underage youth from trying to purchase alcohol. However, FSP laws
may not be effective if few retailers choose to install scanners in their stores, underage
youth substitute towards retailers that do not use scanners, borrow an ID from look-alikes
who are over 21, or ask someone older than 21 to purchase alcohol on their behalf. In this
essay, I first demonstrate that analyses based on NLSY97 data fail falsification exercises
testing for significant pre-intervention effects, and that the estimated effects based on these
data are highly sensitive to the inclusion of a lead term and to sample selection, which
weakens confidence in the large estimated effects reported in [1]. I then use data from
1Prices for ID scanners range from $400 to $1,300. (www.idscanner.com)
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the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System for the analysis and show that estimates
based on these data indicate that false ID laws with scanner provisions have no effect on
underage drinking behavior.
In the second essay, I take advantage of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure pro-
cess to identify how government spending affects local economies. Motivated by beliefs
that the fiscal multiplier is relatively large, the federal government passed the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) to stimulate the economy in 2009 at a cost of
more than $800 billion [2]. Many other countries adopted similar policies in response to
the Great Recession, the worst economic downturn since the 1930s. However, economists
and policy makers still have not reached a consensus on the effectiveness of government
spending. In order to estimate the effect of government spending on local economies, I
exploit variation in the timing and amount of construction funding provided by the 2005
BRAC across counties with military bases. The BRAC process realigned and closed some
military installations to improve military efficiency and effectiveness. A BRAC Commis-
sion was created to provide an objective and non-partisan analysis of military installations.
It then produced a final, non-amendable recommendation list. The commission gave pri-
ority to military value during its selection process, and commissioners recused themselves
from participation in matters related to installations in their home states. Thus, to some
extent, the funding awarded to each county most likely was motivated by military con-
siderations and plausibly was unrelated to local economies. My analysis identifies the
causal effect of the stimulus on local economies under the identifying assumption that,
changes in local economic conditions would have been the same across military counties
absent the 2005 BRAC funding. Using county-level economic data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis’ Regional Economic Accounts and a novel dataset that contains 2005
BRAC construction funding information, I find an estimated cost per job of $65,000 and
a local fiscal multiplier—the change in local per capita income produced by a one dollar
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change in per capita government spending—of 1.21. These estimates are robust to various
model specifications and the empirical strategy passes falsification exercises. Furthermore,
my industry-specific analysis reveals especially large effects on the construction industry,
which is consistent with the nature of the program.
In the third essay, we further takes advantage of the 2005 Base Realignment and Clo-
sure process, an intervention that mostly affects men’s labor market condition, to test
Becker’s (1960) contention that children are “normal." In his first pathbreaking work on
the topic, Gary Becker developed an economic framework treating children as consumer
durables that provide utility to parents over time [3]. Becker recognized that this model
seemed at odds with the negative relationship between household income and family size
in the United States at the time; he surmised that it was driven by differences in knowledge
about birth control, not because children were “inferior goods.” A great deal of subsequent
research was devoted to expanding on Becker’s initial framework so that it could predict
this negative relationship while maintaining that children were normal goods. Most of
these works involved one of two theoretical mechanisms that work in the opposite direc-
tion of the pure income effect: a quantity-quality tradeoff or parental time use. Models
involving a tradeoff between child quantity and child quality can generate a reduction in
the demand for quantity in response to increase in income if the income elasticity for qual-
ity is high relative to the income elasticity for quantity; having children is more costly
when parents plan to invest more in each child. In models that incorporate parental time
into the production function for children, an increase in parental wages generates an in-
come effect that increases the demand for children and a substitution effect that reduces
demand through the effect on the opportunity cost of devoting time to have and raise chil-
dren. Models emphasizing parental time use can also recognize differences in household
roles: the substitution effect is more likely to dominate for wage shocks to primary care-
givers (usually women) while the income effect is more likely to dominate for wage shocks
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other caregivers (usually men). Since men account for more than 90% of all employment
in the construction industry, the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure process provides a
potentially exogenous shock to men’s labor market condition, thus a good opportunity to
test the implication based on parental time allocation model—men’s labor market condi-
tion would have a positive effects on fertility since income effects are likely to dominate
substitution effects in this case. Exploiting variation in the timing and amount of con-
struction funding provided by the 2005 BRAC across counties with military bases, our
analysis suggest that fertility increases with men’s labor market condition, consistent with
the theoretical prediction.
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2. CAN TECHNOLOGY REALLY HELP TO REDUCE UNDERAGE DRINKING?
NEW EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF FALSE ID LAWS WITH SCANNER
PROVISIONS
2.1 Introduction
Youth alcohol use is a prominent public health issue in the United States. As the most
commonly used and abused drug, alcohol is responsible for more than 4,300 deaths and
185,000 emergency room visits among minors every year.1 Moreover, recent studies have
linked underage alcohol consumption to a variety of undesirable outcomes, including risky
sexual behavior [6, 7, 8], mortality [9, 10, 11, 12], morbidity [13], crime [14, 15], poor
academic performance [16, 17], and unemployment [18]. The medical and social costs
associated with underage drinking are estimated to be in the billions of dollars per year
[19].
Given these alarming statistics and findings, how can we best address this problem?
Recently, several states have passed false ID laws with scanner provisions (hereafter, FSP
laws): these laws incentivize alcohol retailers and bar owners to use electronic scanners
to ensure that customers are at least 21 years old and have valid identification.2 [1] uses
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 and a differences-in-difference
design to estimate the effects of these policies on underage drinking and conclude that the
adoption of FSP laws significantly reduces youth alcohol use. Moreover, the magnitude
of the estimates suggests that FSP laws are extremely effective compared to other alcohol
control policies. Prior work has shown that increasing the Minimum Legal Drinking Age
(hereafter, MLDA) reduces drinking participation and binge drinking participation by ap-
proximately 5% [9, 20]; zero tolerance laws have no effect on drinking participation but
1See [4] and [5]
2Prices for ID scanners range from $400 to $1,300. (www.idscanner.com)
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reduce binge drinking participation by 13% for males [21]; social hosting laws have no ef-
fect on underage drinking [22]; vertical ID laws reduce drinking participation for 16 year
olds by 10% but have no effect on binge drinking or drinking frequency [23].3 In contrast,
the estimates reported in [1] suggest that FSP laws reduce binge drinking participation by
15%, frequency of alcohol consumption by 20%, and binge drinking frequency by 30%.
What is the argument for FSP laws as an approach to reducing underage drinking?
FSP laws provide an affirmative defense for retailers in prosecutions for sales to minors if
they can show that the scanner was used properly. These laws have the potential to reduce
alcohol sales to youth through two channels. First, there may be a detection effect because
an electronic scanner makes it easier to detect fake identification used to purchase alcohol.
Second, there may be a deterrence effect as scanners may deter underage youth from trying
to purchase alcohol. However, FSP laws may not be effective if few retailers choose to
install scanners in their stores, underage youth substitute towards retailers that do not use
scanners, borrow an ID from look-alikes who are over 21, or ask someone older than 21
to purchase alcohol on their behalf.4 Given this theoretical ambiguity, it is necessary to
empirically evaluate the effectiveness of these laws, highlighting the importance of [1].
Moreover, if the laws have the large effects reported in [1], it may be efficient for policy
makers in every state to consider adopting FSP laws.
In this paper, I reexamine the impact of FSP laws on underage drinking using a difference-
in-differences method, exploiting within state variation induced by the timing of several
states passing FSP laws. First, I use the restricted National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1997 (NLSY97) to replicate and extend the estimates reported in [1]. I demonstrate that
analyses based on NLSY97 data fail falsification exercises testing for significant pre-
intervention effects, and the magnitude and statistical significance of the estimated effects
3Though not aiming at reducing underage drinking, [24] suggests that medical marijuana laws reduce
drinking participation for 18–19 year olds by around 14%.
4[1] also mentions reasons why FSP laws may not work.
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based on these data are sensitive to the inclusion of a lead term in the specification, weak-
ening confidence in the results originally reported in [1]. Moreover, a fair share of the
significant estimates disappears when the 1997 wave of the NLSY97 is included in the
analysis, casting further doubt on our ability to draw strong conclusions based on analyses
of these data. I then turn to another reasonable data set for estimating the effects of FSP
laws. In particular, I use the 1991–2013 national Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance Sys-
tem (YRBS), which offers a larger sample size and a longer sample period than NLSY97.
Moreover, the YRBS was specifically designed to study youth behaviors, such as alcohol
and other drug use, risky sexual behavior, and tobacco use. Estimates based on these data
indicate that FSP laws have no effect on drinking participation, binge drinking participa-
tion, or drinking and binge drinking frequency. In contrast to the estimates based on the
NLSY97, these results are robust to changes in specifications and do not fail falsification
tests. Moreover, estimates allowing for dynamic treatment effects indicate that FSP laws
have neither short-term nor long-term effects.
2.2 Reconsidering Evidence from NLSY97
To reexamine the effects of FSP laws, I first replicate and extend Yoruk’s (2014) anal-
ysis using the restricted NLSY97 data—the same source of data as used by [1]. The
NLSY97 surveys a nationally representative sample of approximately 9,000 youths who
were 12–16 years old as of December 31, 1996 [25]. These youths have been interviewed
annually since 1997.5 Following [1], I begin by restricting my attention to NLSY97 data
from the period 1998–2005. I then include data from 1997 in the analysis.6
NLSY97 asks respondents how many days did they consume alcohol and engage in
5NLSY97 starts to interview cohorts biennially after 2011.
6Following [1], I restrict the sample period to the year of 2005, because no interviewee in the NLSY97
sample is younger than 21 years old after 2005. A follow-up with Yoruk indicates that, while not mentioned
in Yoruk (2014), those who do not have an exact interview date or exact birthday are dropped, along with
those who reported drinking more than more than 30 drinks a day more than 30 drinks a day.
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binge drinking (consuming five or more drinks in one sitting) in the past 30 days, respec-
tively. Based on this information, I construct Days of Alcohol Consumption and Days of
Binge Drinking to measure drinking and binge drinking frequency, respectively, and these
variables have a value of zero if participants have not drunk or binge drunk in the past 30
days. Using information on drinking and binge drinking frequency, I also generate two
dummy variables—If Consumed Alcohol and If Binge Drank—to measure unconditional
drinking and unconditional binge drinking participation in the past 30 days, respectively.
The remaining variable, Average Drinks per Day, measures drinking intensity, which is
calculated as Days of Alcohol Consumption times average drinks per sitting divided by 30.
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics. In the table, we see that the means and standard
deviations I calculate from the NLSY97 sample are close to those reported in [1].
Following [1], I use a difference-in-differences methodology in the analysis, exploiting
variation in the timing of FSP law adoption across states. Specifically, I estimate the
following model:
Yistm = β
′
Xistm + α
′
Sstm + γFSPistm + µs + ηt + λm + δst + εistm
where i indicates individuals, s indicates states, t indicates years, and m indicates months.
In this model, Yistm is a measure of drinking behavior;Xistm refers to a variety of individual-
level controls, including age, gender, race, family size, income, marital status, employment
status, educational attainment and being a student; Sstm is a vector of state-level time-
varying controls, including unemployment rates, per capita income, state beer taxes rates,
and indicators for several other alcohol policies, including BAC 0.08 laws, social host-
ing laws, Sunday alcohol sales, and vertical ID laws; δst indicates state-specific linear time
trends.7 The state, year and month fixed effects are captured by µs, ηt and λm, respectively.
7I follow [1] in constructing control variables. I define treatment using introduction dates of FSP laws
from the [26], and law effective dates are listed in Table C.1. The data for state beer taxes are from the Beer
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Variable N Mean S.D.
Panel A: If Consumed Alcohol
Replication: NLSY97 (98–05) 40,164 0.476 0.499
Extension: NLSY97 (97–05) 49,089 0.431 0.495
YRBS (98–05) 54,730 0.464 0.499
YRBS (91–13) 157,288 0.455 0.498
Panel B: If Binge Drank
Replication: NLSY97 (98–05) 40,097 0.275 0.446
Extension: NLSY97 (97–05) 49,020 0.246 0.431
YRBS (98–05) 56,539 0.292 0.455
YRBS (91–13) 164,501 0.286 0.452
Panel C: Days of Alcohol Consumption
Replication: NLSY97 (98–05) 40,164 2.685 4.938
Extension: NLSY97 (97–05) 49,089 2.373 4.688
YRBS (98–05) 54,730 2.616 5.116
YRBS (91–13) 157,288 2.507 4.926
Panel D: Days of Binge Drinking
Yoruk(2014): NLSY97 (98–05) 40,249 1.283 3.308
Replication: NLSY97 (98–05) 40,097 1.249 3.214
Extension: NLSY97 (97–05) 49,020 1.108 3.042
YRBS (98–05) 56,539 1.299 3.465
YRBS (91–13) 164,501 1.233 3.332
Panel E: Average Drinks per Day
Replication: NLSY97 (98–05) 39,883 0.548 1.562
Extension: NLSY97 (97–05) 48,786 0.481 1.465
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Underage Drinking
Notes: Sample weighted means are reported.
FSPistm is the variable of interest, which equals one if a FSP law is in effect at month m,
year t in state s for individual i. The estimate of γ identifies the causal effect of FSP laws
on underage drinking under the identifying assumption that, in the absence of FSP laws,
Institute’s [27]; unemployment rates are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); state-level income per
capita are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA); the introduction dates of BAC 0.08 laws, social
hosting laws, and Sunday alcohol sales are from the Alcohol Policy Information System; and data on the
introduction years of vertical ID laws are from [23].
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the change in underage alcohol consumption in the states passing FSP laws would have
been the same as the change in underage alcohol consumption in other states. Models with
binary outcome variables are estimated as linear probability models, and standard errors
are clustered at the state level [28].
Table 2.2 is a replication of Yoruk’s main results. Column 1 shows my replication of
the baseline estimates, from a model that includes state, year and month fixed effects, and
Column 2 through 4 progressively add individual- and state-time-varying controls, a lead
term (a dummy variable for the two years before the policy adoption), and state-specific
linear time trends to the estimation strategy. Columns 5 through 8 are similar but addition-
ally control for individual fixed effects. The estimated effects of the FSP laws reported
in this table are often statistically significant, suggesting that FSP laws reduce underage
drinking. However, the estimated effects of the lead term are statistically significant nearly
as often. Convention would have us interpret these estimates as failed placebo tests that
cast doubt on the main results.
Table 2.3 extends the analysis by also using data from the 1997 survey wave, which
increases the sample size by about 20%. [1] does not discuss why these data were not
included in his analyses. However, these data would appear to be particularly important
because they disproportionately include young teens while his analysis of heterogeneity
indicates that his main results are largely driven by effects on young teens.
The results shown in this table demonstrate that Yoruk’s choice to omit data from 1997
leads to estimates that are statistically significant about twice as often as they are when
this additional year of data is used in the analysis. This lack of robustness casts further
doubt on our ability to draw any strong conclusion based on analyses of the NLSY97 data.
I also note that the lead terms continue to be large and significant for a couple of outcomes
when 1997 data are included in the analysis.
To conclude, the results from the NLSY97 are sensitive to the inclusion of a lead term,
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: If Consumed Alcohol
FSP Laws -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 0.024 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.015
(0.011) (0.014) (0.018) (0.024) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.021)
1–2 Years Prior to FSP Laws -0.005 0.007 -0.001 -0.002
(0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010)
N 40,164 40,070 40,070 40,070 40,164 40,070 40,070 40,070
R2 0.039 0.106 0.106 0.108 0.068 0.077 0.077 0.082
Panel B: If Binge Drank
FSP Laws -0.023* -0.023* -0.038** -0.011 -0.023*** -0.028** -0.035** -0.016
(0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018)
1–2 Years Prior to FSP Laws -0.026*** -0.018* -0.014* -0.016*
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
N 40,097 40,004 40,004 40,004 40,097 40,004 40,004 40,004
R2 0.032 0.095 0.095 0.097 0.051 0.060 0.060 0.064
Panel C: Days of Alcohol Consumption
FSP Laws -0.168* -0.156* -0.357*** -0.269** -0.208* -0.266** -0.441*** -0.398***
(0.093) (0.087) (0.088) (0.103) (0.121) (0.116) (0.118) (0.116)
1–2 Years Prior to FSP Laws -0.364*** -0.396*** -0.322*** -0.396***
(0.079) (0.106) (0.083) (0.099)
N 40,164 40,070 40,070 40,070 40,164 40,070 40,070 40,070
R2 0.026 0.084 0.084 0.085 0.054 0.065 0.065 0.068
Panel D: Days of Binge Drinking
FSP Laws -0.125 -0.111 -0.251*** -0.082 -0.136* -0.158** -0.272*** -0.151*
(0.091) (0.071) (0.087) (0.101) (0.073) (0.077) (0.092) (0.077)
1–2 Years Prior to FSP Laws -0.254*** -0.199*** -0.209*** -0.202***
(0.054) (0.065) (0.046) (0.038)
N 40,097 40,004 40,004 40,004 40,097 40,004 40,004 40,004
R2 0.020 0.071 0.071 0.073 0.037 0.044 0.045 0.048
Panel E: Average Drinks per Day
FSP Laws -0.086** -0.071 -0.128*** -0.100*** -0.121*** -0.124** -0.173*** -0.138***
(0.039) (0.045) (0.038) (0.033) (0.041) (0.046) (0.043) (0.043)
1–2 Years Prior to FSP Laws -0.104*** -0.099** -0.091*** -0.091***
(0.036) (0.040) (0.025) (0.027)
N 39,883 39,790 39,790 39,790 39,883 39,790 39,790 39,790
R2 0.013 0.051 0.051 0.052 0.022 0.027 0.027 0.029
Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
1–2 Years Prior to FSP Laws No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
State-specific Linear Time Trends No No No Yes No No No Yes
Individual Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2.2: Attempted Replication of [1]’s Main Results, Highlighting Significance of
Leads
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Sample is 1998–2005 NLSY97 survey. All regressions include state, year
and month fixed effects. Individual-level controls include age, gender, race, family size, income, marital status,
employment status, educational attainment and being a student. State-level controls include unemployment rate, log
of income per capita, state beer tax per gallon, and dummy variables controlling for various state policies on youth
alcohol access. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Estimates are unweighted.
raising concerns about the validity of the common trends assumption with this dataset.
Moreover, the results are sensitive to sample selection. When the entire available sample
is used, a fair share of the previously significant results disappears, and almost all the esti-
mates become smaller in magnitude when 1997 data are included in the analysis. Overall,
this set of estimates substantially weakens the confidence in the results originally reported
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: If Consumed Alcohol
FSP Laws -0.002 0.007 0.007 0.028 0.003 0.007 0.010 0.031*
(0.013) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016)
1–2 Years Prior to FSP Laws -0.001 0.009 0.007 0.011
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
N 49,089 48,979 48,979 48,979 49,089 48,979 48,979 48,979
R2 0.071 0.135 0.135 0.137 0.124 0.133 0.133 0.137
Panel B: If Binge Drank
FSP Laws -0.014 -0.009 -0.015 -0.013 -0.017* -0.015 -0.015 -0.015
(0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016)
1–2 Years Prior to FSP Laws -0.014 -0.012 0.001 -0.003
(0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008)
N 49,020 48,911 48,911 48,911 49,020 48,911 48,911 48,911
R2 0.047 0.105 0.105 0.107 0.078 0.086 0.086 0.090
Panel C: Days of Alcohol Consumption
FSP Laws -0.140 -0.080 -0.190* -0.238*** -0.161 -0.161 -0.235* -0.315***
(0.090) (0.095) (0.109) (0.061) (0.098) (0.109) (0.121) (0.065)
1–2 Years Prior to FSP Laws -0.269*** -0.311*** -0.182** -0.252**
(0.083) (0.096) (0.089) (0.103)
N 49,089 48,979 48,979 48,979 49,089 48,979 48,979 48,979
R2 0.043 0.095 0.096 0.097 0.080 0.091 0.091 0.094
Panel D: Days of Binge Drinking
FSP Laws -0.080 -0.052 -0.123 -0.124 -0.093 -0.102 -0.147 -0.171**
(0.086) (0.076) (0.092) (0.092) (0.078) (0.078) (0.096) (0.074)
1–2 Years Prior to FSP Laws -0.174*** -0.163*** -0.110* -0.128**
(0.063) (0.056) (0.063) (0.053)
N 49,020 48,911 48,911 48,911 49,020 48,911 48,911 48,911
R2 0.027 0.072 0.072 0.074 0.047 0.054 0.054 0.058
Panel E: Average Drinks per Day
FSP Laws -0.065** -0.036 -0.064** -0.056* -0.088*** -0.071** -0.086** -0.084***
(0.029) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.027) (0.033) (0.033) (0.026)
1–2 Years Prior to FSP Laws -0.070 -0.053 -0.039 -0.030
(0.046) (0.048) (0.042) (0.040)
N 48,786 48,677 48,677 48,677 48,786 48,677 48,677 48,677
R2 0.021 0.055 0.055 0.057 0.035 0.040 0.040 0.042
Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
1–2 Years Prior to FSP Laws No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
State-specific Linear Time Trends No No No Yes No No No Yes
Individual Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2.3: Extending [1] to Utilize Full NLSY97 Sample
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Sample is 1997–2005 NLSY97 survey. All regressions include state, year
and month fixed effects. Individual-level controls include age, gender, race, family size, income, marital status,
employment status, educational attainment and being a student. State-level controls include unemployment rate, log
of income per capita, state beer tax per gallon, and dummy variables controlling for various state policies on youth
alcohol access. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Estimates are unweighted.
in [1].8
8Table C3 presents my attempted replication and extension of Yoruk’s (2014) dynamic analysis, with
Panel A omitting 1 year before the FSP laws, and shows that none of the estimates are significant. These
results are at odds with Yoruk’s (2014) finding of an immediate effect on average drinks per day. Moreover,
while the indicators for years leading up to the policies are insignificant in this specific analysis, this appears
to be due to a lack of power associated with using a single year of baseline data (i.e. having only one
year serve as the omitted category) when sample size is small. It is evident from my main results that the
indicators for 1-2 years prior to the laws are significant when all prior years are used as the baseline. I have
also performed an analysis that is closer in spirit to Yoruk’s analysis of dynamics that enhances power by
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2.3 New Evidence from YRBS
2.3.1 Main Results
In this section, I turn to an alternative data set for estimating the effects of FSP laws—
the restricted national Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBS) [29]. YRBS is
a biennial survey spanning the years from 1991 to 2013. It surveys a nationally represen-
tative sample of youth about their health-risk behaviors, such as alcohol and drug use.9
Primarily designed to monitor health-risk behavior that contributes significantly to death,
disability, and social problems among youth, the YRBS provides comprehensive informa-
tion on youth alcohol consumption. It has been used in a number of other studies on youth
health behavior [23, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36]. Unlike the NLSY97, this survey focuses
exclusively on ninth through twelfth grade students; however, this is arguably an attrac-
tive feature in this context, because Yoruk’s (2014) estimates suggest 13–17 year olds are
responsive to these policies whereas older individuals are not.10
One potential advantage of the NLSY97 dataset is that it allows for the inclusion of
individual fixed effects. However, the results based on the NLSY97 with and without
individual fixed effects do not differ, which is not surprising because it is unlikely that
individual characteristics are correlated with the introduction of FSP laws. In contrast,
the primary advantages of the YRBS dataset are a much larger sample size and a much
omitting 1-2 years prior to the policies instead of just one. I present the results of this analysis in Panel B
of Table C3. These estimates also indicate that Yoruk’s (2014) NLSY97 sample fails the falsification tests.
As a whole, this set of results further weakens confidence in the conclusions drawn from Yoruk’s analysis of
FSP laws.
9YRBS codes 7 for people aged 18 years and over, so potentially the sample could include people over
age 21. Inclusion of individuals aged over 21 will attenuate the results, since FSP laws only targets people
under the age of 21. However, because YRBS targets ninth through twelfth graders, it is unlikely that they
are over 21. According to 2013 Current Population Survey October supplements, people 21 years old and
older account for only 2.5% of the entire high school population. Thus, I recode these people as 18 years
old and include them in the main analysis. I drop individuals whose age information is missing, accounting
for around 2% of the entire sample.
10See Table 6 in [1]. The reasons, as suggested by [1], could be that young teens have less chance
of knowing someone older than 21 to purchase alcohol for them; they are more likely to be asked for
identification in the stores; and they are not in college where alcohol is more accessible.
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longer sample period. These advantages have important implications for the reliability of
the analysis. First, larger samples are expected to more closely approximate the population
and to enhance precision. Second, the longer sample period of the YRBS offers a longer
pre-treatment period than the NLSY97, which is crucial for a difference-in-differences
identification strategy. Having few years of pre-treatment data increases the risk that the
estimates may be biased by anomalous spikes in the data prior to treatment, which might
explain why the NLSY97 estimates vary considerably when controlling for a lead term.
Same as the NLSY97, YRBS also asks individuals about their frequency of alcohol
use in the previous 30 days, including the number of days of alcohol consumption and
the number of days of binge drinking (consuming five or more drinks in one sitting).11
Following the same method as used in the NLSY97 sample, I construct Days of Alcohol
Consumption and Days of Binge Drinking to measure drinking and binge drinking fre-
quency, respectively, and also generate two dummy variables—If Consumed Alcohol and
If Binge Drank—to indicate unconditional drinking and binge drinking participation in the
past 30 days, respectively.12
11Note that for both males and females in YRBS binge drinking is defined as five drinks in one sitting,
which is consistent with NLSY97. Other data sources may set the reference level at four drinks for females.
For questions on drinking frequency, YRBS codes 1 as no drinking, 2 as drinking 1 or 2 days, 3 as drinking
3 to 5 days, etc. I recode no drinking to 0 and use the midpoint to recode the rest. That is, I recode 1.5 for
drinking 1 or 2 days, 4 for drinking 3 to 5 days, 7.5 for drinking 6 to 9 days, 14.5 for drinking 10 to 19 days,
24.5 for drinking 20 to 29 days and 30 for drinking 30 days. The same applies for binge drinking frequency.
I recode 0 for reporting no binge drinking, 1 for binge drinking 1 days, 2 for binge drinking 2 days, 4 for
binge drinking 3 to 5 days, 7.5 for binge drinking 6 to 9 days, 14.5 for binge drinking 10 to 19 days, and 25.5
for binge drinking over 20 days. Table A4 presents an analysis I perform to show that measurement errors
are not responsible for the discrepancy in results between YRBS and NLSY97 samples. Using Yoruk’s
(2014) NLSY97 sample, I recoded the responses following YRBS’s coding scheme for the two variables
that were interpolated based on mid-point of ranges, and present results using both the original and recoded
responses. Estimates based on the two sets of responses are similar, indicating that measurement errors are
not responsible for the differences in results.
12One thing to note about the YRBS data is that it does not contain the exact dates of the interview.
However, all surveys took place between February and May of odd-number years. Since none of the policy
changes happened during an interview window, treatment status can be assigned without error. I use all
of the data available. [1] does not treat Nebraska and Utah as treatment states because no interviewee in
NLS797 is under 21 after 2005, and these states passed FSP laws in 2009 and 2010, respectively. Moreover,
the statistical significance and magnitude of the estimates remain robust if these states are excluded.
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Summary statistics presented in Table 2.1 allows for a comparison of the NLSY97 and
the YRBS. The summary statistics based on the YRBS and NLSY97 are remarkably sim-
ilar for the four underage drinking indicators calculated from both samples, even though
the size of the full sample of YRBS is more than three times of the NLSY97’s.
Table 2.4 shows the main results from YRBS sample, and each underage drinking
measure is presented panel by panel.13 Column 1 presents estimates from the baseline
specification, which simply controls for state and year fixed effects.14 The results from
this specification indicate that FSP laws have no effect on drinking participation, binge
drinking participation, drinking frequency, or binge drinking frequency. As precise as the
estimates based on the NLSY97 sample, these estimates can not rule out large positive
or negative impact of the FSP laws though. In Column 2, I add controls for economic
conditions and state-level underage alcohol control policies, as well as individual charac-
teristics.15 I note that the estimate for binge drinking participation becomes positive and
significant at the 10% level once these controls are added; however, the point estimate
is positive and is not robust across specifications. Overall, the results change little once
time-varying controls are added, suggesting that there may be little scope for omitted, un-
observed factors to bias the estimates, and supporting the conclusion that FSP laws have
no effect on reducing any of the underage alcohol consumption measures.
In Column 3, I also include a lead term to the specification: a dummy variable for
the two years before the policy changes. Under the common trends assumption, the co-
efficient on the lead term should be zero and the inclusion of this lead term should not
13The results are unweighted so that they are comparable to [1]’s main results. Weighted results are shown
in Appendix.
14[1] also controls for month fixed effects, which is infeasible for the YRBS data. However, this should
not influence the estimates, as the interview period of YRBS is from February to May, a period that does not
exhibit much seasonal variation in alcohol consumption behavior [37].
15YRBS has information on age, gender and race. Other individual characteristics such as marital status,
employment status and income level are not available on YRBS; however, it should not meaningfully affect
the estimates since individual-level characteristics are unlikely to be correlated with whether states passed
FSP laws. Also, only a small fraction of underage minors are married or have jobs.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: If Consumed Alcohol
FSP Laws 0.006 0.013 0.016 -0.004
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.022)
1–2 Years Prior to FSP Laws 0.017 0.004
(0.015) (0.019)
N 157,288 155,480 155,480 155,480
Panel B: If Binge Drank
FSP Laws 0.007 0.019* 0.023** 0.009
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.026)
1–2 Years Prior to FSP Laws 0.022* 0.016
(0.011) (0.017)
N 164,501 162,585 162,585 162,585
Panel C: Days of Alcohol Consumption
FSP Laws 0.116 0.224 0.253* 0.192
(0.118) (0.136) (0.130) (0.276)
1–2 Years Prior to FSP Laws 0.146 0.133
(0.135) (0.176)
N 157,288 155,480 155,480 155,480
Panel D: Days of Binge Drinking
FSP Laws 0.040 0.125 0.142 0.125
(0.075) (0.087) (0.086) (0.221)
1–2 Years Prior to FSP Laws 0.085 0.092
(0.069) (0.113)
N 164,501 162,585 162,585 162,585
Control Variables No Yes Yes Yes
1–2 Years Prior to FSP Laws No No Yes Yes
State-specific Linear Time Trends No No No Yes
Table 2.4: Estimated Effects of FSP Laws on Underage Drinking Using YRBS Data
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sample is 1991–2013 YRBS survey. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. Individual-level controls
include gender, race and age. State-level controls include unemployment rate, log of income per capita, state beer
tax per gallon, and dummy variables controlling for various state policies on youth alcohol access. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level. Estimates are unweighted.
meaningfully change the estimated effects. Unlike the results from the NLSY97 sample,
the coefficients for the lead term are not significant, which provides support for the validity
of the analysis using these data. Moreover, the estimates with and without a lead term are
very similar, all suggesting that FSP laws do not reduce underage drinking. In Column 4,
16
I add state-specific linear time trends to the specification, thereby allowing each state to
follow a different trend. To conclude, the estimates are largely robust under various model
specifications, and provide little evidence that FSP laws have reduced any of the underage
alcohol consumption behavior.16
As an additional way of estimating the effects of FSP laws on drinking, I investigate
dynamic responses in youth drinking behavior to the adoption of FSP laws. I do so by
replacing the indicator for having a FSP law in place with a set of indicator variables cor-
responding to 5–6, 3–4, 1–2 years prior to adoption, the year of adoption, and 1–2, 3–4,
5-or-more years after policy adoption.17 As before, I continue to control for individual-
and state-time-varying controls and state-specific linear time trends. Figure 2.1 plots co-
efficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from the dynamic analysis. This figure
shows that none of the coefficient estimates for years leading up to the policy changes are
statistically significant at the 5% level, supporting the common trends assumption. More-
over, the same is true for the lags, indicating that FSP laws have no effect on reducing
underage drinking behavior in the short term or in the long term.
2.4 Conclusion
Youth alcohol use imposes substantial costs on society and has long been a major pub-
lic health concern in the United States. In this paper, I employ a difference-in-differences
design to reexamine the effect of false ID laws with scanner provisions on underage drink-
16Figure B.1 presents a graphical analysis to explore if the estimates are sensitive to the treated states
considered and if there are heterogeneous treatment effects across states. I continue to use a model with state
and year fixed effects, controls, and state-specific linear time trends, but drop 1, 2 or 3 treatment states in this
analysis. Figure A1 plots the coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence interval against the ranking of
coefficient estimates from this analysis. As estimates are rarely significant in Figure B.1, it shows that there
are no heterogeneous treatment effects across states and, further, FSP laws do not reduce underage alcohol
use. Yoruk (2014) also shows that the estimated effects he documents are not driven by any particular states.
Noting that the YRBS does not cover all states in all years, these results provide reassuring evidence that the
differences between the estimates reported in Yoruk (2014) and those documented here are unlikely to be
driven by differences in the composition of states included in the NLSY97 and YRBS.
17Since YRBS is a biennial survey, I combine two years (1-2 etc.) together instead of estimating year-by-
year effects.
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If Consumed Alcohol If Binge Drank
Days of Alcohol Consumption Days of Binge Drinking
Figure 2.1: Estimated Effects of FSP Laws, Lags and Lead
Notes: Sample is 1991–2013 YRBS survey. Coefficient estimates are from a model controlling for state and year
fixed effects, controls and state-specific linear time trends. Controls include gender, race, unemployment rate, log
of income per capita, state beer tax per gallon, and dummy variables controlling for various state policies on youth
alcohol access. Standard errors are clustered at the state level, and 95% confidence intervals are shown in dash line.
The omitted years are seven and more years prior to law adoption. Estimates are unweighted.
ing using 1991–2013 national Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System data. In contrast
to previous findings based on the NLSY97, the results using these data indicate that these
laws have no effect on reducing underage drinking behavior, and that conclusion is robust
under various model specifications. Estimates allowing for dynamic treatment effects lead
to the same conclusion. Moreover, a replication and extension of prior work using the
NLSY97 suggests that previously reported estimates based on those data are not reliable.
18
As a whole, my analyses suggest that a stricter false ID law with enforced use of electronic
scanners in alcohol sales is not an effective approach to reducing underage drinking.
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3. NEW EVIDENCE ON THE LOCAL FISCAL MULTIPLIER AND
EMPLOYMENT FROM MILITARY CONSTRUCTION SPENDING
3.1 Introduction
One cannot overemphasize the need to better understand the effects of government
spending. Is government spending really effective at stimulating the economy? How
much does it cost to create a job? And, how large is the multiplier? Motivated by beliefs
that the fiscal multiplier is relatively large, the federal government passed the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) to stimulate the economy in 2009 at a cost of
more than $800 billion [2]. Many other countries adopted similar policies in response to
the Great Recession, the worst economic downturn since the 1930s. However, economists
and policy makers still have not reached a consensus on the effectiveness of government
spending.
The debate arises partly because theoretical models offer contradictory predictions.
Simple neoclassical models usually yield a small multiplier (typically less than 0.5) while
New Keynesian models can yield predictions larger than 2 [38]. Difficulty in measuring
the counterfactual in the macroeconomy only adds to the debate. To tackle this problem,
a recent stream of the empirical literature utilizes cross-sectional variation to estimate the
income multiplier and cost per job. However, this line of empirical evidence also offers
a wide range of estimates for the cost per job ($25,000–$125,000) and the local income
multiplier (0.4–2.2). This wide range of estimates may be due to differential effects of
government spending across different periods of time, across different places or to hetero-
geneous treatment effects across various types of government spending [39].
This paper offers new evidence on the effectiveness of government spending. It is
the first to estimate the cost per job and the local multiplier associated with construction
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spending.1 It is also the first paper to examine the effects of the $25 billion Base Realign-
ment and Closure (hereafter, BRAC) military construction program on local economies.2
As such, it is quite relevant to the ongoing discussions about the Department of Defense’s
proposal of another BRAC in the near future.
In order to estimate the effect of government spending on local economies, I exploit
variation in the timing and amount of construction funding provided by the 2005 BRAC
across counties with military bases. The BRAC process realigned and closed some mili-
tary installations to improve military efficiency and effectiveness.3 A BRAC Commission
was created to provide an objective and non-partisan analysis of military installations. It
then produced a final, non-amendable recommendation list. The commission gave prior-
ity to military value during its selection process, and commissioners recused themselves
from cases related to installations in their home states. Thus, to some extent, the funding
awarded to each county most likely was motivated by military considerations and plausibly
was unrelated to local economies.
My analysis identifies the causal effect of the stimulus on local economies under the
identifying assumption that, changes in local economic conditions would have been the
same across military counties absent the 2005 BRAC funding. Using county-level eco-
nomic data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Regional Economic Accounts and a
novel dataset that contains 2005 BRAC construction funding information, I find an es-
timated cost per job of $65,000 and a local fiscal multiplier—the change in local per
1A couple of studies have investigated the effects of public highway spending on economic outcomes.
[40] studies the impulse response of state output to the Federal-Aid Highway Program, a program to fund
construction, maintenance, and other improvements on a large array of public roads. [41] examines the
effects of public infrastructure investment on output using a structural VAR and aggregate U.S. data.
2[42] also studies the effects of 2005 BRAC on local economies, but he focuses on the effects of personnel
relocation as opposed to construction funding. As shown in Section 3.4 of this paper, the observed effects
are driven by construction funding, not personnel relocation. This paper explicitly examines the identifying
assumption and explores the treatment effects dynamics, which are not feasible for [42] as it only uses one
year of pre-treatment data (2005) and one year of post-treatment data (2011).
3I restrict the analysis to counties that did not experience any closure during the process in order to better
investigate the effects of government stimulus, excluding disinvestment.
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capita income produced by a one dollar change in per capita government spending—of
1.21. These estimates are robust to various model specifications and the empirical strategy
passes falsification exercises. Furthermore, my industry-specific analysis reveals espe-
cially large effects on the construction industry, which is consistent with the nature of the
program.
Traditional Keynesian model usually yields a larger prediction on multiplier when the
economy is in slack; that is, when some factors of production are in idle. In this case,
counties in slack may benefit more from government spending compared to other counties.
To test this hypothesis, I use unemployment rate as a measure of “slack” in an economy
and divide the funded counties into counties with higher and lower unemployment rates.
Results from this analysis provide mixed evidence. The estimates suggest larger effects on
income for counties with higher unemployment rates. However, the effects on employment
are larger for counties with lower unemployment rates.
To further understand the regional impacts of government spending, I extend the analy-
sis to directly measure the extent to which there are spillovers across neighboring counties.
I find little evidence of any likely spillover effects. Furthermore, I investigate the extent
to which there are spillovers on the construction industry for nearby counties, since the
construction industry is directly affected by the program. These estimates are uniformly
positive and larger, providing suggestive evidence that the BRAC funding leads to higher
employment for construction workers nearby but has no effect on income for those work-
ers.
In order to speak to the mechanisms at work, I also examine the extent to which the
BRAC stimulus affects in-migration and out-migration. What if government spending at-
tracts many high-ability migrants and they take the employment opportunities and drive
up the average income? In this case, local residents may not gain from increased govern-
ment funding because the benefits of the stimulus instead accrue to migrants. My analysis
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suggests that government spending has positive effects on in-migration and no effects on
out-migration to the funded and nearby counties. However, the effects on migration are
too small to explain the main results. This suggests that residents of the funded counties
do benefit from the government spending.
It is important to note that the multiplier estimated in this paper is local, as opposed
to the extensively studied national multiplier [43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49]. Estimating the
local multiplier does not inform us directly about the magnitude of the national multiplier,
which has been the focus of the literature and is of great policy concern. Indeed, spillovers
and migration are more likely to occur within a country rather than across country borders
[50]. When a stimulus does lead to spillovers, or attracts migration, the local multipliers
may be larger or smaller than the national multiplier depending on the direction and mag-
nitude of the effects. For instance, if there are positive spillovers across counties, then the
local multiplier will not fully capture the effects of government spending and thus will be
smaller than the national multiplier. On the other hand, if government spending attracts
many migrants who take employment opportunities and drive up average income, then
the local multiplier will be larger than the national multiplier. The fact that there is not
a one-to-one mapping between local and national multipliers does not negate the policy
relevance of local parameters. State and local governments spend over 3 trillion dollars
every year, and the effects of regional spending are certainly of interest to local policy
makers and residents. Thus, while this paper is only informative about national stimulus,
it provides a direct estimate of the effectiveness of regional investment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I discuss related
literature. Section 3.3 provides some background on the 2005 Base Realignment and
Closure. Section 3.4 describes the methodology and data used to analyze the causal impact
of government spending on local economics. Section 3.5 presents empirical results of
my analyses. Section 3.6 concludes and provides a discussion of the implications of the
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results.
3.2 Related Literature
For decades, macroeconomists have tried to model and estimate the national fiscal
multiplier, a parameter that summarizes the effects of government spending at the national
level. Yet, there is still considerable debate over its magnitude. The debate arises in part
because theoretical models offer contradictory predictions.4 Simple neoclassical models
often yield a small multiplier (usually smaller than 0.5); [51] find that temporary spending
financed by a distortionary tax could lead to a multiplier as small as -2.5. New Keynesian
models, on the other hand, yield a wide range of predictions, depending crucially on the
monetary policy. Less responsive monetary policy, such as the case of “zero lower bound,"
could yield a multiplier as large as 2.3 [52, 53, 54].5 Difficulty in measuring the counter-
factual only adds to the debate. To tackle this problem, this line of literature employs two
major approaches. The first is to use a structural VAR model, which relies on structural
assumptions and small changes in the assumptions can lead to large differences in the es-
timated multiplier [45, 55]. The second approach uses military spending associated with
wars as potentially exogenous shocks [48, 43, 46, 56]. However, major episodes of war
are rare, and other fiscal policies, patriotism, or capacity constraints that occur during the
war could confound the estimates.
A recent stream of the empirical literature uses cross-sectional variation to estimate the
local income multiplier and cost per job.6 A number of these studies have used variation in
the geographic distribution of funds under the ARRA. [58] use state-level formula-driven
variation in the allocation of ARRA Medicaid spending; they estimate a cost per job of
4[38] provides a thorough review of the leading theories on the effects of government spending and
related empirical work.
5At the zero lower bound, the nominal interest rate is held constant while inflation drives the real interest
rate down [38].
6See [57] for a thorough review on this line of literatures.
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around $25,000 and a local income multiplier of about 2. [59] uses a similar approach to
estimate the overall employment effects of the total ARRA spending, but finds a state-level
cost per job of around $125,000 per year. The reason for differences in results between
these two papers may be that medical spending and other types of expenditures have dif-
ferent effects on the economy. [39] also use state-level variation in the allocation of ARRA
funding; they estimate a cost per job of $107,000 with an implied income multiplier from
0.5 to 1. They also suggest that the overall results mask considerable variation for different
types of spending. Low income assistance programs and infrastructure spending are found
to be highly expansionary while grants to states for education do not seem to have created
any additional jobs.
Other studies have explored different sources of variation to estimate these parameters.
[60] use variation in federal spending that is induced by the fact that much direct federal
spending, and transfer programs to a local area depend on population estimates which are
exogenously “shocked" after each Decennial Census. They estimate a county-level cost
per job of $30,000 per year and income multiplier of 1.7 to 2. [61, 62] uses differences
in returns to state pension funds as “windfall" shocks to state spending; he estimates a
state-level income multiplier of 2.2 and a cost per job of around $35,000 per year. [63]
use variation across states in federal spending during the Great Depression and estimate an
income multiplier of 1.1 and no significant effect on employment. [64] use state spending
cuts induced by institutional rules on budget deficits to estimate a spending multiplier
of 0.4. [65] use regional variation in military procurement spending to estimate a local
multiplier of 1.5. Their theoretical model relates the estimated local multiplier to the
traditional national multiplier; and their estimates fit well with an open economy New
Keynesian model in which consumption and labor are complements. Finally, [66] use
province-level variation in the temporary contractions in local public spending directed at
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combatting the Mafia in Italy to estimate a local multiplier of 1.5.7 Overall, this line of
literature offers a wide range of estimates for cost per job ($25,000–$125,000) and the
income multiplier (0.4–2.2).
This paper complements the existing literature by providing the first estimates of cost
per job and local multiplier based on a military construction program. This is of particular
significance if heterogeneous treatment effects across various types of government spend-
ing may explain why we observe such a wide range of empirical estimates. Moreover, it
provides guidance to policy makers as to how limited funding should be allocated across
various types of expenditures. Furthermore, I use a recent spending episode (2006–2011)
which is relevant to current policy if the effects of public spending vary across periods. In
addition, this research adds to the literatures on the effects of the BRAC process on various
outcomes [68, 69, 70, 71]. Because the Department of Defense is proposing another round
of the BRAC in the near future and a sizable amount of money is at stake, it is valuable
that this paper sheds light on the stimulus benefits of the program itself.
3.3 Base Realignment and Closure
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) is a congressionally authorized process that
the Department of Defense has used to reorganize its base structure [72]. Its goal is to
more efficiently and effectively support the armed forces and to enhance operational readi-
ness. The Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act,
enacted on October 24, 1988, provided the basis for implementation of the 1988 BRAC
recommendations. On November 5, 1990, President George H. W. Bush signed the De-
fense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, an attempt to isolate political influence
from military activity. This act established an independent commission, the Defense Base
7[67] uses an instrumental variable approach to investigate how stimulus-motivated federal funding di-
rected to universities affects the economies of the counties in which the institutions are located, but they find
little evidence of a stimulus effect, which could be due to the fact that only a small fraction of the funding
“stuck where they hit".
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Closure and Realignment Commission, to ensure a timely, independent, and fair process
for closing and realigning U.S. military installations. Since then, there have been four ad-
ditional BRACs in 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005. The 2005 BRAC cost around 35 billion
dollars, more than the sum of the previous 4 BRACs, and thus provides a good opportunity
for examining the local effects of stimulus.
On May 13, 2005, the Department of Defense issued the initial recommendation list
for the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure. An independent panel of nine commissioners
was created to provide an objective and non-partisan review and analysis of that list. It
then produced a final non-amendable recommendation list.8 During this selection process,
the commission followed eight selection criteria and it gave priority to military value.9
To enhance the impartiality and integrity of the BRAC process, commissioners recused
themselves from cases related to installations in their home states.10 President George W.
Bush approved the 2005 BRAC commission’s recommendation on September 15, 2005
with a statutory deadline of September 15, 2011. Given the process by which decisions
were made, it is likely that the funding awarded to each county was motivated by military
considerations and not local economic conditions. I provide graphical evidence and con-
duct a robustness check to support this hypothesis in Section 3.4. First, I show that funded
and non-funded military counties did not have divergence in economic conditions prior to
the first year of funding. Then, I perform a robustness check to show that the estimates are
robust to the exclusion of states that were connected to the 2005 BRAC Commission; that
is, the estimates remain robust after I drop states in which any of the commissioners were
8The 2005 BRAC commission consists of Anthony J. Principi, James H. Bilbray, Philip Coyle, Harold
W. Gehman, Jr., James V. Hansen, T. Hill, Lloyd W. Newton, Samuel K. Skinner, Sue E. Turner.
9See Appendix A.1 for a full list of selection criteria.
10Four commissioners have recused themselves from cases relating to installations in their home states.
Commissioners Coyle and Gehman recused themselves because of their participation in BRAC-related activ-
ity in California and Virginia respectively. Commissioners Bilbray and Hansen recused themselves because
of their long-time representation in the Congress and other public offices of Nevada and Utah respectively
(www.brac.gov).
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born or have worked.
Figure 3.1: Geographic Distribution of Annual BRAC Funding per Capita
Source: 2013 Base Realignment and Closure Commission Execution Report
The 2005 BRAC cost over 35 billion dollars; military construction alone cost around
25 billion dollars. Figure 3.1 presents the geographic distribution of the average annual per
capita construction funding across the United States. The mean of the average annual per
capita funding is roughly $122 for the funded counties. Almost every state has counties
that received construction funding. In addition to funding construction across the nation,
the 2005 BRAC relocated around 200,000 military and civilian personnel. The average
net change in direct jobs was a net loss of 27 jobs per installation throughout the process
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[42]. In Section 3.4, I conduct a robustness check and show that the main results are not
due to personnel relocation. This is not surprising, as net personnel change only accounts
for a tiny portion of county population.
3.4 Data and Methodology
3.4.1 Data
The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure construction funding data come from the
2013 Base Realignment and Closure Commission Execution Report [73]. It summarizes
the costs and savings for each the Department of Defense Component throughout the six-
year BRAC implementation period (2006–2011). It also lists detailed annual construction
funding information at the installation level. I geocode and aggregate this information
into county-level funding information. To distinguish between the effects of personnel
relocation and construction funding, I obtain county-level annual personnel counts for the
years 2002 through 2011 from the U.S. Base Structure Reports. This administrative report
is published annually by the Department of Defense, and lists annual installation-level
personnel counts for installations of at least ten acres and at least $10 million in “Plant
Replacement Value."11 The personnel counts include military personnel, federal civilian
employees and other non-military personnel, such as contractor personnel. I geocode and
aggregate these personnel counts to county-level counts.
The data on county-level economic activity come from the Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis’ (BEA) Regional Economic Accounts [74]. These data provide a wealth of economic
statistics at the county level, including per capita income and employment.12 The dataset
11I use 2003–2012 Base Structure Reports because reports published in year t+1 would provide informa-
tion on the personnel counts in year t. After 2012, the annual report changes format and stops listing per-
sonnel counts at the base level. “Plant Replacement Value" represents the Military Service or Washington
Headquarter Service calculated cost to replace the current physical plant (facilities and supporting infras-
tructure) using today’s construction cost (labor and materials) and standards (methodologies and codes).
12BEA reports data on a calendar year basis, whereas Department of Defense reports funding on a fiscal
year basis. For instance, fiscal year 2005, begins on October 1, 2004 and ends on September 30, 2005. I
match fiscal year directly with calendar year in the empirical analysis. This matching procedure should yield
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comes from a variety of administrative sources. Employment and wage data are from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW)
[75]. It reports on workers covered by the state Unemployment Insurance (UI) program
and federal workers covered by the Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees
(UCFE) program. The BEA then adjusts these data for employment and wages not cov-
ered, or not fully covered, by these programs to provide more comprehensive measures of
income and employment. The Regional Economic Accounts also have annual information
on economic activity for large industries, such as construction and manufacturing, at the
county level.
To further investigate whether migrants drive the main results, I use county-level mi-
gration data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Statistics of Income [76]. The IRS
tracks inflows and outflows based on address changes of individual tax filers. I use these
data to construct measures of the number of individuals and households moving into and
out of a particular county and to evaluate how the 2005 BRAC construction funding affects
in-migration and out-migration.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics based on these data. County-level per capita
income and employment average around $33,000 and 120,000 across treatment and con-
trol counties respectively over the sample period. Construction employment accounts for
around 6% of all employment in these counties. Military personnel account for about
1.24% of the overall population in those counties, more than the U.S. average of around
0.78%.13
a relatively conservative estimate.
13Currently, there are 1.4 million active military personnel and 1.1 million reserve personnel in the United
States.
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Variable N Mean S.D.
Panel A: Outcome Variables
Employment 5,370 127,161 199,438
per Capita Income 5,370 33,917 8,235
Employment: Construction Industry 5,163 7,630 11,854
Personal Income: Construction Industry 5,168 404,793 742,842
Number of Households: In-migration 5,449 5,429 7,879
Number of Individual: In-migration 5,449 10,072 14,219
Number of Households: Out-migration 5,449 5,334 7,840
Number of Individuals: Out-migration 5,449 9,941 14,476
Panel B: Control Variables
Population 5,370 214,354 32,6572
Percentage of Females 5,370 0.504 0.020
Percentage of Hispanics 5,370 0.093 0.136
Percentage of African Americans 5,370 0.105 0.136
Number of Personnel 4,108 2,654 7,809
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Note: The sample includes counties receiving the construction funding and counties with at least one military base
reported in 2005 Base Structure Report.
3.4.2 Methodology
To identify the effects of government spending on local economies, I exploit variation
in the timing and amount of BRAC construction funding across counties. Specifically, I
estimate the following model:
Yit = α + βperCapitaFundingit + µi + ηt +Xit + δst + uit
where i indicates counties, t indicates years, and s indicates states. In this model, Yit is a
measure of the county economic condition; Xit refers to county-level time-varying demo-
graphic controls, including population, percentage Hispanic, African American, and fe-
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male; and δst represents state-by-year fixed effects.14 The county and year fixed effects are
captured by µi and ηt, respectively. The county fixed effects control for county-level time-
invariant characteristics and year fixed effects controls for nationwide economic shocks in
any year. Moreover, I also include state-by-year fixed effects to capture state-level eco-
nomic shocks in any given year. The inclusion of state-by-year fixed effects allows coun-
ties in different states to follow different trajectories and account for differential shocks by
state over time. In this case, the crucial assumption is that in the absence of the 2005 BRAC
construction funding, changes in economic condition would have been the same across all
military counties in the same state. The variable of interest is perCapitaFundingit, which
measures 2005 BRAC construction funding at year t in county i.
Noted that while the BRAC report provides data on funding awarded, information on
when the funding was spent is not available. Thus, I assume that all funding received by a
county was spent linearly beginning in the year of receipt. That is, perCapitaFundingit
equals zero prior to the receipt of any funding for county i and equals Fundingit
Populationi,2005
for
years after the initial funding receipt.15 I make that assumption for two reasons. First,
according to the Department of Defense’s policy, military construction funding can remain
available for up to five years. Second, most installations completed their projects in 2011,
even though the Department of Defense distributed most of the funding between 2007 and
2009, and few counties received funding in 2011 [42].16 The estimate of β identifies the
14The county-level demographic data come from the U.S. Census Bureau.
15Each BRAC construction project should be at least 35-percent design complete to request funding from
the Department of Defense, which generates variation in the timing of counties’ first funding receipt. And
Fundingit is defined as TotalFundingi2011−firstyearoffundingreceipt+1i for years after the initial funding receipt. I use
population counts in 2005 to generate the treatment variable because population could be affected by gov-
ernment spending and 2005 is the last year prior to the BRAC construction program. I also present esti-
mates where perCapitaFundingit equals zero prior to the receipt of any funding for county i and equals
Fundingit
Populationit
for years after the first year of funding receipt in Appendix Table A1. The results are robust to
this exercise.
16Another assumption could be that each individual funding awarded to a county at a given year is spent
equally between that year and 2011. For instance, County A receive M million dollars in 2008 and N million
dollars in 2010, so spending for County A would be M4 million dollars in 2008 and 2009, and
M
4 +
N
2 million
dollars in 2010 and 2011. The results are robust to this alternative assumption of spending pattern and are
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causal effect of 2005 BRAC funding under the identifying assumption that, in the absence
of the BRAC construction funding, the change in outcomes across counties would have
been the same. Finally, standard errors are clustered at the state level to allow for arbitrary
correlation of the error term at the state level across counties and years.
In reality, counties with military installations are likely to be systematically different
from counties that do not have installations. For this reason, I restrict my sample of un-
funded counties to those with at least one military installation in the 2005 Base Structure
Report, the administrative report on military installations that is published annually by
the Department of Defense.17 I further restrict the overall sample to counties that did not
experience any closure during the 2005 BRAC to better investigate the effects of govern-
ment spending, excluding disinvestment. The sample period is 2002–2011 for the main
analysis. I use 2002 because it is the first year after the completion of the previous BRAC
and 2011 because it is the statutory deadline for completion of the 2005 BRAC. When I
explore treatment effects over time, I extend the sample period through 2013 to investigate
whether the funding has lingering effects.
3.5 Results
In this section, I begin by presenting my main results. They are followed by robustness
checks verifying that these results are robust under alternative identification strategies, to
the exclusion of states linked to the 2005 BRAC Commission, and that they are not driven
by personnel relocation. Then, I test the hypothesis that the effects of government spending
are larger during periods of slack and examine the heterogeneous treatment effects of
government spending across high and low unemployment counties. Next, I extend my
analysis to explore the extent to which there are spillovers on the nearby counties. Finally,
I examine the effects on migration to investigate whether migrants are responsible for the
shown in Appendix Table A2.
17I use the 2005 report because it is the last one published prior to the 2005 BRAC.
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main results.
3.5.1 Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Log(Employment)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.030** 0.033***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009)
N 5,370 5,370 5,370 5,370
Panel B: Log(Per Capita Income)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.056*** 0.050** 0.045*** 0.038***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.011) (0.012)
N 5,370 5,370 5,370 5,370
Cost per Job 57,563 54,533 69,075 64,795
Income Multiplier 1.79 1.59 1.44 1.21
Controls No Yes No Yes
State-by-Year Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes
Table 3.2: Estimated Effects of 2005 BRAC Construction Funding on Local Economic
Conditions
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include county and year fixed effects. County-level con-
trols include population, percentage of female, Hispanics and African Americans. Standard errors are clustered at
the state level. Control counties are counties with at least one military base reported in base structural report in
2005, the last report published prior to the 2005 BRAC. Estimates are unweighted. The cost per job is calculated
as $1,000×pre-funding average of population size for funded countiesestimated percentage change×pre-funding average of employment for funded counties and the local fiscal multiplier is calculated as
estimated percentage change×pre-funding average of per capita income for funded counties
$1,000
.
Table 3.2 presents my main results with Panel A showing the estimated effects on
employment and Panel B on income. Column 1 shows estimates from the baseline speci-
fication, simply controlling for county and year fixed effects. The results from this spec-
ification suggest that a $1,000 increase in annual per capita BRAC construction funding
would increase employment by 3.6%, or roughly 5,100 jobs.18 This implies a cost per job
18This number is calculated by multiplying 3.8% by 134,580, the pre-funding average of employment for
funded counties.
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of approximately $57,563, because it takes roughly 279 million dollars ($1,000 per capita
spending multiplied by 278,884, which is the pre-funding population average for funded
counties) to create these jobs. Similarly, the estimate implies that a $1,000 increase in
annual per capita BRAC funding would increase per capita income by 5.6%. Multiply-
ing this number by $31,891—the pre-funding average of per capita income in the funded
counties—yields an increase of roughly $1,790. This estimate implies a fiscal multiplier
of 1.79.
Column 2 adds county-level time-varying demographic controls to the model. Adding
these covariates may be over-controlling, because county-level demographic character-
istics could be affected by government spending and thus a causal path between local
stimulus and economic conditions. So it is unclear whether the estimates in Column 2 are
superior to those in Column 1. Nonetheless, the results change little after adding these
controls. These estimates imply a cost per job of $54,533, and a fiscal multiplier of 1.59.
In Column 3, I present the results of a specification in which I control for county, year,
and state-by-year fixed effects. Adding state-by-year fixed effects to the model controls
for statewide economic shocks. The estimates from this specification suggest that a $1,000
increase in annual per capita funding would increase employment by 3.0% and per capita
income by 4.5%, implying an estimated cost per job of around $69,075 and income multi-
plier of 1.44. Finally, in Column 4 I present a specification in which I control for state-by-
year fixed effects and county-level time-varying controls. The results change little, with
an estimated cost per job of approximately $64,795 and an income multiplier of 1.21. To
summarize, the estimates in Table 3.2 provide strong evidence that the BRAC construc-
tion funding had a significant impact on employment and income for funded counties, and
these estimates are robust to various model specifications.
As an additional way to estimate the effects of government spending on local economies,
I investigate the dynamic responses of economic conditions to 2005 BRAC construction
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Logged Employment Logged per Capita Income
Figure 3.2: Estimated Effects of 2005 BRAC Construction Funding, Lags and Lead
Note: Data to generate these figures are from BEA. These figures present the coefficient estimates from a model that
includes county fixed effects, year fixed effect, state-by-year fixed effects and county-level time-varying controls.
County-level controls include population, percentage of female, Hispanics and African Americans. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level. Control counties are counties with at least one military base reported in base structural
report in 2005, the last report published prior to the 2005 BRAC. Estimates are unweighted.
funding. To do that, I interact average per capita funding with a set of indicator variables
that correspond to 1, 2, 3, 4 years prior to the first year of funding receipt, the first year of
funding receipt, and 1, 2, 3, 4, 5-or-more years after the first year of funding receipt. As
in Column 4 of Table 3.2, I continue to control for county, year, state-by-year fixed effects
and county-level time-varying demographic characteristics. Figure 3.2 plots the coeffi-
cient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from this analysis. None of the coefficient
estimates for the years leading up to the funding receipt are statistically significant at the
5% level, supporting the common trends assumption. Furthermore, the estimates for years
after the first year of funding receipt provide some evidence that the effects on employ-
ment and income are concentrated in the short term and it fades away once the funding is
discontinued.
Finally, because the construction industry is directly affected by BRAC, we might ex-
pect there to be larger effects on this industry. I investigate this hypothesis and present
the results in Table 3.3. Estimates from this industry-specific analysis are uniformly larger
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Log(Employment)
Annual BRAC Funding per Capita 0.139*** 0.138*** 0.111*** 0.108***
(0.027) (0.024) (0.036) (0.033)
Observations 5,163 5,163 5,163 5,163
Panel B: Log(Personal Income)
Annual BRAC Funding per Capita 0.203*** 0.202*** 0.142** 0.138***
(0.038) (0.036) (0.053) (0.049)
N 5,168 5,168 5,168 5,168
Controls No Yes No Yes
State-by-Year Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes
Table 3.3: Estimated Effects of 2005 BRAC Construction Funding on Construction Indus-
try
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . All regressions include county and year fixed effects. County-level controls
include population, percentage of female, Hispanics and African Americans. Standard errors are clustered at the state
level. Control counties are counties with at least one military base reported in base structural report in 2005, the last
report published prior to the 2005 BRAC. Estimates are unweighted.
than the main results, suggesting that BRAC construction funding does have an especially
large effect on the construction industry. Results from the specification where I control
for county, year, state-by-year fixed effects and county-level time-varying demographic
characteristics indicate that a $1,000 increase in per capita funding increases construc-
tion employment by 10.8% and personal income by 13.8%.19 Compared with the main
results—a 6.8% increase in overall employment and 3.8% increase in per capita income—
these estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that the BRAC funding has a larger
impact on the construction industry.
3.5.2 Robustness Checks
This section presents several tests to check the robustness of the main results. I begin
by presenting results where I drop all unfunded counties from the analysis and only use
19BEA publish personal income as opposed to per capita income for large industries and population counts
by industry is unavailable, so I focus on personal income instead of per capita income in the industry-specific
analysis.
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variation in the timing and amount of funding among funded counties. Next, I extend the
analysis to explore the extent to which dropping states linked to the 2005 BRAC Com-
mission affects the results. Finally, I investigate whether the effects are driven by military
personnel relocation or the stimulus.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Log(Employment)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.029** 0.034***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.015) (0.008)
N 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250
Panel B: Log(Per Capita Income)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.057*** 0.048** 0.049*** 0.039***
(0.021) (0.018) (0.010) (0.007)
N 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250
Cost per Job 79,701 69,075 71,457 60,948
Income Multiplier 1.82 1.53 1.56 1.24
Controls No Yes No Yes
State-by-Year Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes
Table 3.4: Estimated Effects of 2005 BRAC Construction Funding on Local Economic
Conditions: Restricting Analysis to Funded Counties
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 These estimates utilize variation in the timing and amount of fund-
ing awarded within funded counties to estimate the results. All regressions include county and year fixed ef-
fects. County-level controls include population, percentage of female, Hispanics and African Americans. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the state level. Estimates are unweighted. The cost per job is calculated as
$1,000×pre-funding average of population size for funded counties
estimated percentage change×pre-funding average of employment for funded counties and the local fiscal multiplier is calculated as
estimated percentage change×pre-funding average of per capita income for funded counties
$1,000
.
In Table 3.4, I present the estimates based only on funded counties. This estimation
strategy compares counties receiving lower levels of construction funding per capita to
counties that receive more funding per capita. Each column in Table 3.4 follows the same
specification as Table 2. The estimates are similar to those presented in Table 2; Column
4 indicates a 3.4% increase in employment and a 3.9% increase in per capita income for a
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$1,000 increase in annual per capita funding. That implies a cost per job of around $60,948
and an income multiplier of 1.24. The estimates remain robust when I use an alternative
source of variation, lending further support to the main results.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Log(Employment)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.035***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008)
N 3,390 3,390 3,390 3,390
Panel B: Log(Per Capita Income)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.050** 0.042** 0.045*** 0.036***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013)
N 3,390 3,390 3,390 3,390
Cost per Job 70,637 72,915 66,482 64,582
Income Multiplier 1.65 1.39 1.49 1.19
Controls No Yes No Yes
State-by-Year Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes
Table 3.5: Estimated Effects of 2005 BRAC Construction Funding on Local Economic
Conditions: Omitting States Linked to the 2005 BRAC Commission
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include county and year fixed effects. County-level
controls include population, percentage of female, Hispanics and African Americans. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the state level. Control counties are counties with at least one military base reported in base struc-
tural report in 2005, the last report published prior to the 2005 BRAC. Estimates are unweighted. Counties
in state linked to the 2005 BRAC Commission are dropped from the analysis. The cost per job is calculated
as $1,000×pre-funding average of population size for funded countiesestimated percentage change×pre-funding average of employment for funded counties and the local fiscal multiplier is calculated as
estimated percentage change×pre-funding average of per capita income for funded counties
$1,000
.
In Section 3.3, I discussed the institutional background of the 2005 BRAC program,
arguing that political factors played a small role in the BRAC process and that funding was
mainly motivated by military considerations. The analysis above supports this argument:
it shows no evidence of economic divergence prior to the receipts of BRAC construction
funding. None of the coefficient estimates for the years leading up to the funding award are
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statistically significant. However, this does not rule out the possibility that commissioners
may have voted in favor of their connected states and that political factors may affect the
BRAC process in a significant way. It is important to note that this sort of behavior would
only bias the estimates if it was related to expected economic outcomes.
In any case, to address this concern, I conduct a robustness check by dropping states
where any of the commissioners were born or had worked at any time throughout their
career.20 If the estimates change substantially after dropping those counties, then it would
raise concerns about political involvement during the BRAC process. The estimates pre-
sented in Table 3.5 remain close to those shown in Table 2: estimates from Column 4 imply
a cost per job of around $64,582 and a local fiscal multiplier of 1.19, This suggests little
evidence of political manipulation that is systematically related to economic conditions.21
Because military personnel were relocated during 2005 BRAC process, the main re-
sults could be driven by more military personnel moving to the funded counties. To address
this concern, I include logged military personnel counts as a covariate in my analysis. I
present the estimates in Table 3.6. When I control for military personnel, the estimated
effects of BRAC construction funding change little. Estimates from Column 4 imply a
cost per job of approximately $57,166 and an income multiplier of 1.21. Furthermore, the
estimates on logged personnel counts are small and never statistically significant, reassur-
ing us that the main effects indeed are driven by funding, not personnel relocation. This
finding is consistent with the fact that the number of military personnel in a county only
accounts for a small portion of the population, and on average there is only a net loss of
27 jobs per installation throughout the process [42].22
20I drop the following states in this analysis: Arizona, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington.
21The estimated cost per job is calculated as $1,000×258,4713.5%×140,167 , and the local fiscal multiplier is calculated as
$33,070×3.6%
$1,000 .
22The estimated cost per job is calculated as $1,000×343,1233.8%×167,397 , and the local fiscal multiplier is calculated as
$32,672×3.7%
$1,000 .
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Log(Employment)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Logged(Personnel) -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
N 4,108 4,108 4,108 4,108
Panel B: Log(Per Capita Income)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.052*** 0.045** 0.044*** 0.037***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.013)
Logged(Personnel) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
N 4,108 4,108 4,108 4,108
Cost per job 58,710 57,166 57,166 57,166
Income Multiplier 1.70 1.47 1.44 1.21
Controls No Yes No Yes
State-by-Year Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes
Table 3.6: Estimated Effects of 2005 BRAC Construction Funding on Local Economic
Conditions: Considering Personnel Relocation
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include county and year fixed effects. County-level controls
include population, percentage of female, Hispanics and African Americans, and natural log of military personnel
counts. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Control counties are counties with at least one military
base reported in base structural report in 2005, the last report published prior to the 2005 BRAC. Estimates are
unweighted. The cost per job is calculated as $1,000×pre-funding average of population size for funded countiesestimated percentage change×pre-funding average of employment for funded counties and
the local fiscal multiplier is calculated as estimated percentage change×pre-funding average of per capita income for funded counties
$1,000
.
Overall, these robustness checks indicate that the main results are robust under alter-
native identification strategies. Also, we observe little political manipulation related to
economic conditions during the BRAC process, which lends further support to the iden-
tification strategy. Also, the main results are driven by the funding, not by relocation of
military personnel. All of this evidence supports an interpretation of the main results as
cost per job and income multiplier.
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3.5.3 Heterogeneous Effects
The traditional Keynesian model implies larger multipliers when the economy is in
slack; that is, when some production factors are in idle.23 This theoretical prediction im-
plies that we shall observe larger effects on income and employment for counties that
have idle productive capacity. If so, government spending may have a redistributional ef-
fect in addition to its stimulating effects: areas in slack would benefit more from the same
amount of government spending than other areas. In this section, I investigate this issue by
examining the degree to which the effects of BRAC funding on income and employment
differ by the amount of slack in the local economy as measured by the unemployment rate.
Specifically, I divide the funded counties into two groups based on their unemployment
rates in the year of 2005, the last year prior to any counties receiving the BRAC construc-
tion funding. Table 3.7 presents results from this analysis. Panel A presents the results
for counties with higher unemployment rates while Panel B for those with lower unem-
ployment rates in 2005. Contracted to the theoretical prediction, the point estimates for
employment effects are larger for counties with lower unemployment rates, which could
be due to the fact that counties with lower unemployment rates in the sample are more
likely to be larger counties with more job opportunities. The effects on income, on the
other hand, provide some evidence to support the slack hypothesis—economies in slack
seems to gain more from federal spending. The estimated multiplier for counties with
lower unemployment rates is smaller relative to the counties with higher unemployment
rates and less robust to alternative model specifications.
23Empirical evidence from the macroeconomics literature yields contrasting results on whether govern-
ment spending multipliers are larger during periods of slack. [77] and [78] find evidence of larger multipliers
during periods of slack, while [79], [80], and [81] do not observe higher multipliers during times of slack.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: High Unemployment Rate
Panel A1: Log(Employment)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.029* 0.030**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.015) (0.012)
N 4,750 4,750 4,750 4,750
Panel A2: Log(Per Capita Income)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.058** 0.048** 0.047*** 0.038***
(0.023) (0.021) (0.014) (0.013)
N 4,750 4,750 4,750 4,750
Cost per Job 70,660 72,939 77,968 75,371
Income Multiplier 1.72 1.42 1.39 1.12
Panel B: Low Unemployment Rate
Panel B1: Log(Employment)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.074** 0.089*** 0.052* 0.063***
(0.032) (0.027) (0.028) (0.022)
N 4,740 4,740 4,740 4,740
Panel B2: Log(Per Capita Income)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.036 0.060* 0.025 0.029
(0.033) (0.033) (0.015) (0.018)
N 4,740 4,740 4,740 4,740
Cost per Job 25,931 21,561 36,903 30,459
Income Multiplier 1.23 2.06 0.86 0.99
Controls No Yes No Yes
State-by-Year Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes
Table 3.7: Estimated Effects of 2005 BRAC Construction Funding on Local Economic
Conditions: High vs Low Unemployment Rate Counties
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . Data on migration pattern are from IRS county migration
data. All regressions include county and year fixed effects. County-level controls include population, per-
centage of female, Hispanics and African Americans. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Con-
trol counties are counties with at least one military base reported in base structural report in 2005, the last
report published prior to the 2005 BRAC. Estimates are unweighted. The cost per job is calculated as
$1,000×pre-funding average of population size for funded counties
estimated percentage change×pre-funding average of employment for funded counties and the local fiscal multiplier is calculated as
estimated percentage change×pre-funding average of per capita income for funded counties
$1,000
.
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3.5.4 Spillover Effects
To further examine the effects of the BRAC construction funding, I consider the im-
pact on neighboring counties.24 This extension of the baseline analysis helps to capture
the total regional impact of the stimulus; government spending may create externalities
for neighboring counties that did not directly receive BRAC funding. Positive spillovers
across counties would suggest that the main analyses understate the total regional effects
of the BRAC funding. Spillovers might arise, for example, if some construction materials
are purchased from neighboring counties: this increase in demand for input would have
positive effects on those counties. On the other hand, if we find negative spillovers on
nearby counties, then the main results may overstate the regional impact of the stimulus.
For example, if the BRAC funding leads to higher wages and attracts migrants from neigh-
boring counties, then decreases in population could have negative effects on businesses in
those counties, ultimately resulting in negative spillovers.
In order to estimate the spillover effects, I define neighboring counties as the 10 nearest
counties based on highway distance between county centroids for every county in the
main analysis.25 Comparing counties near the funded counties to those near the unfunded
military counties, my results are shown in Table 3.8. None the estimates are significant and
there is little evidence of spillovers. The estimates are precise enough to rule out effects
on employment on the order of 1% at the 5 percent significance level for a $1,000 increase
in per capita funding. Also the estimates on per capita income can rule out meaningful
negative impact smaller than -0.6% at the 5 percent level.
Because the construction industry is directly affected, it is likely that the BRAC fund-
ing would lead to higher demand for construction workers in the funded counties, and
would also drive up the income and employment for construction workers in the nearby
24[60] also finds little evidence of spillovers across neighboring counties.
25The County-to-County Distance data are from the Center for Transportation Analysis.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Log(Employment)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) -0.001 0.000 -0.008 -0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
N 24,010 24,010 24,010 24,010
Panel B: Log(Per Capita Income)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.010
(0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008)
N 24,010 24,010 24,010 24,010
Controls No Yes No Yes
State-by-Year Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes
Table 3.8: Spillover Effects of 2005 BRAC Construction Funding on Neighboring Coun-
ties
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . All regressions include county and year fixed effects. County-level controls
include population, percentage of female, Hispanics and African Americans. Standard errors are clustered at the state
level. Control counties are counties with at least one military base reported in base structural report in 2005, the last
report published prior to the 2005 BRAC. Estimates are unweighted. Nearby counties are selected according to
highway distance.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Log(Employment)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.033 0.031 0.030** 0.031**
(0.021) (0.020) (0.014) (0.013)
N 21,951 21,951 21,951 21,951
Panel B: Log(Personal Income)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.048 0.045 0.030 0.031
(0.039) (0.038) (0.028) (0.027)
N 21,951 21,951 21,951 21,951
Controls No Yes No Yes
State-by-Year Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes
Table 3.9: Spillover Effects of 2005 BRAC Construction Funding on Construction Indus-
try
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . All regressions include county and year fixed effects. County-level controls
include population, percentage of female, Hispanics and African Americans. Standard errors are clustered at the state
level. Control counties are counties with at least one military base reported in base structural report in 2005, the last
report published prior to the 2005 BRAC. Estimates are unweighted. Nearby counties are selected according to
highway distance.
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counties. For this reason, I also explore the spillover effects on the construction indus-
try specifically. These results are shown in Table 3.9. The effects on employment are
not robust across specifications, but the signs are uniformly positive, suggesting potential
positive spillovers on employment in the construction industry.
3.5.5 Are Migrants Responsible for the Effects?
Are migrants are responsible for the main effects on employment and income?26 If
government spending does not lead to changes in migration, it would suggest that the
effects we observe for the funded counties are likely driven by local residents, who benefit
from increased government funding through higher incomes and more job opportunities.
On the other hand, if government funding leads to higher wages and thus attracts many
high-ability migrants, the observed effects on employment and income could be mainly
driven by migrants. If this is the case, then the benefits of government spending accrue to
the migrants instead of the local residents. To explore this question, I use IRS migration
data and separately investigate the effects on in-migration and out-migration.
Table 3.10 shows the results of this analysis. The results suggest that government
spending has a positive impact on in-migration to the funded counties, but little effect on
out-migration. The estimate from a specification where I control for county, year, state-
by-year fixed effects and county-level time-varying demographic characteristics indicate
that a $1,000 increase in annual BRAC funding per capita attracts around 1,000 additional
migrants.27 Given the average population size of the funded counties (200,000), these ad-
ditional migrants are not likely to have created an increase in per capita income of 4%
as estimated in the main results. Similarly, because a $1,000 increase in per capita fund-
ing could increase employment by more than 5,000 as calculated from the main results,
26[82] finds positive migration effects of government spending, and [62] find little evidence of migration
effects.
27This number is calculated as 6.7%×13, 807.22, the pre-funding average of in-migrations for the funded
counties.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Inflow
Panel A1: Log(Households)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.057* 0.060**
(0.028) (0.025) (0.033) (0.029)
N 5,369 5,369 5,369 5,369
Panel A2: Log(Individuals)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.084** 0.080*** 0.065* 0.067**
(0.032) (0.028) (0.036) (0.032)
N 5,369 5,369 5,369 5,369
Panel B: Outflow
Panel B1: Log(Households)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.023 0.029 0.022 0.028
(0.022) (0.020) (0.025) (0.023)
N 5,369 5,369 5,369 5,369
Panel B2: Log(Individuals)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.027 0.031 0.028 0.033
(0.024) (0.022) (0.028) (0.025)
N 5,369 5,369 5,369 5,369
Controls No Yes No Yes
State-by-Year Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes
Table 3.10: Estimated Effects of 2005 BRAC Construction Funding on Migration
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . Data on migration pattern are from IRS county migration data. All
regressions include county and year fixed effects. County-level controls include population, percentage of female,
Hispanics and African Americans. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Control counties are counties with
at least one military base reported in base structural report in 2005, the last report published prior to the 2005 BRAC.
Estimates are unweighted.
the observed effects on employment are unlikely to be driven by migrants to the funded
counties.
BEA measure employment and income based on place of work, but IRS migration files
measure migration pattern based on change of addresses, a place of residence measure. So
it is possible that migrants move to counties near funded counties and take the employment
opportunities in the funded counties. To investigate this hypothesis, I examine the impact
of the BRAC funding on migration for the nearby counties. Similar to my analysis on the
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Inflow
Panel A1: Log(Households)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.026** 0.023* 0.017* 0.017*
(0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009)
N 23,980 23,980 23,980 23,980
Panel A2: Log(Individuals)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.035** 0.031** 0.026** 0.025**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012)
N 23,980 23,980 23,980 23,980
Panel B: Outflow
Panel B1: Log(Households)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.012 0.014 -0.002 0.002
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012)
N 24,078 24,078 24,078 24,078
Panel B2: Log(Individuals)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.016 0.016 -0.000 0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
N 24,078 24,078 24,078 24,078
Controls No Yes No Yes
State-by-Year Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes
Table 3.11: Spillover Effects of 2005 BRAC Construction Funding on Migration for
Neighboring Counties
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . Data on migration pattern are from IRS county migration data. All
regressions include county and year fixed effects. County-level controls include population, percentage of female,
Hispanics and African Americans. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Control counties are counties with
at least one military base reported in base structural report in 2005, the last report published prior to the 2005 BRAC.
Estimates are unweighted.
spillover effects, I define neighboring counties as the 10 nearest counties based on highway
distance between county centroids. Table 3.11 presents the results from this analysis. The
results show that the stimulus has a positive effect on in-migration to the neighboring
counties, but no effects on out-migration. The estimates on in-migration shows that a
$1,000 increase in annual BRAC funding attracts around 2,000 additional migrants to
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the ten nearest counties.28 Combining these results with those on the funded counties,
a $1,000 increase in annual BRAC funding attracts around 3,000 additional migrants in
total. However, the effect on migration is still too small to have created an increase in per
capita income of 4% and an additional 5,000 jobs for the funded counties. Thus, local
residents do benefit from the stimulus.
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, I exploit variation across counties in the timing and amount of construc-
tion funding provided by the 2005 BRAC to estimate the effects of government spending
on local economic conditions. My analysis yields an estimated cost per job of approxi-
mately $65,000 and a local fiscal multiplier of around 1.21, and these estimates are robust
to various model specifications. Furthermore, an industry-specific analysis finds especially
large effects on the construction industry, which is consistent with the nature of the spend-
ing. To better understand the regional impact of the BRAC funding, I directly estimate
spillover effects on neighboring counties. I find little evidence of spillovers; however,
there is suggestive evidence of positive spillovers on construction employment for neigh-
boring counties.
To test traditional Keynesian prediction that economies with higher amount of slack
would gain more from government spending, I investigate if counties with higher unem-
ployment rates benefit more from the stimulus. Results from this analysis are mixed.
While the effects on income are larger for counties with higher unemployment rates, im-
plying a larger multiplier for those counties, the effects on employment are larger for
counties with lower unemployment rates.
Finally, to better understand how stimulus affects relocation decision, I also exam-
ine the effects of government spending on in-migration and out-migration. Government
28This number is calculated as 10×2.6%×78, 00, where 78,00 is the pre-funding average of in-migration
for each of the nearby counties.
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spending potentially could attract more in-migration into the funded areas, so the main
estimated effects could be driven mainly by migrants. My analysis shows that government
spending has positive effects on in-migration to funded counties and their neighboring
counties but no effects on out-migration. In any case, the migration effects are too small to
bring about the results I observe in the main analyses. Thus we can conclude that residents
of the funded counties do benefit from the government spending.
This paper complements the existing literature on the regional impacts of stimulus by
estimating the effects of a quite recent military construction program. The magnitude of
the estimated cost per job falls in the middle of the distribution on the employment ef-
fects of government spending. Still, the income effects I estimate are modest compared to
estimates based on other stimulus programs. I therefore conclude that government spend-
ing, especially construction spending, could play a significant role in creating jobs and
increasing income. Because the construction industry is usually one of the hardest-hit
during economic downturns [83], and my results suggest especially large effects for this
sector, it seems that government investment in construction could effectively mitigate eco-
nomic slowdowns. Furthermore, heterogeneous treatment effect analysis shows that this
program has a larger income effects on counties with higher unemployment rates. Thus,
to the extent that the federal government wants to redistribute resources to counties with
more slack, the BRAC construction program provides an attractive approach for its impact
on those counties and the fact that it allows the federal government to directly engage in
stimulating the economy.
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4. BETTER ECONOMY, MORE BABIES? NEW EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF
ECONOMIC CONDITION ON CHILDBEARING
4.1 Introduction
Dating back to [84], economists have had an interest in understanding decisions asso-
ciated with childbearing and how economic factors affect this decision-making process.
In his first pathbreaking work on the topic, Gary Becker developed an economic frame-
work treating children as consumer durables that provide utility to parents over time [3].
Becker recognized that this model seemed at odds with the negative relationship between
household income and family size in the United States at the time; he surmised that it was
driven by differences in knowledge about birth control, not because children were “inferior
goods.” A great deal of subsequent research was devoted to expanding on Becker’s initial
framework so that it could predict this negative relationship while maintaining that chil-
dren were normal goods. Most of these works involved one of two theoretical mechanisms
that work in the opposite direction of the pure income effect: a quantity-quality tradeoff
or parental time use. Models involving a tradeoff between child quantity and child quality
can generate a reduction in the demand for quantity in response to increase in income if
the income elasticity for quality is high relative to the income elasticity for quantity; hav-
ing children is more costly when parents plan to invest more in each child. In models that
incorporate parental time into the production function for children, an increase in parental
wages generates an income effect that increases the demand for children and a substitution
effect that reduces demand through the effect on the opportunity cost of devoting time to
have and raise children. Models emphasizing parental time use can also recognize dif-
ferences in household roles: the substitution effect is more likely to dominate for wage
shocks to primary caregivers (usually women) while the income effect is more likely to
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dominate for wage shocks other caregivers (usually men).
These types of models have been extremely influential in the way that economists
think about household decision-making and the family. At the same time, there does not
appear to be a clear consensus on which of the proposed mechanisms explains the observed
negative relationship between household incomes and fertility, which at this point has been
documented across households in various countries, across countries with regards to GDP
per capita, and within countries over time as they experience economic development [85].
The main challenge, as pointed out by [86], is a lack of exogenous shock to household
income.1
In this paper, we examine a recent large economic shock that affects mostly men’s
employment and wage. Specifically, we exploit variation in the timing and the amount of
construction funding provided by the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) pro-
cess. The 2005 BRAC spent 35 billion dollars between the years 2006 and 2011 to realign
and close military installations to improve military efficiency and effectiveness, and 25
billion dollars are dedicated as construction funding.2 Because of the institutional char-
acteristics of the program, the funding awarded to each county most likely was motivated
by military considerations and plausibly was unrelated to local economies. [87] provides
evidence to support this hypothesis and shows that the program has a large impact on
county-level employment and per capita income. Moreover, [87] shows that the effects
are particularly large for the construction industry. Since men account for more than 90%
of construction employment, this intervention provides a potentially exogenous shock to
men’s labor market condition, providing a good opportunity to test whether children are
“normal." Exploiting variation in the timing and amount of construction funding provided
1[86] also highlights that exogenous variation in the “price” of children is necessary to determine whether
any quantity-quality tradeoff exists.
2We restrict the analysis to counties that did not experience any closure during the process because base
closure may have its own impacts on birth rates through mental stress.
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by the 2005 BRAC across counties with military bases, our analysis suggest that fertility
increases with men’s labor market condition, consistent with the theoretical prediction.3
Our analysis identifies the causal effect of the stimulus on childbearing under the iden-
tifying assumption that, changes in birth rates would have been the same across military
counties absent the 2005 BRAC funding. Using gender-specific county-level employment
and wage information from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD)
program’s Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) in conjunction with a novel dataset that
contains 2005 BRAC construction funding information, we first demonstrate that a $1,000
increase in per capita spending is associated with a 4.5% increases in men’s employment
and 2% increase in men’s wage, but it has no effects on women’s employment or wage.
Then, using county-level birth rates data calculated from the National Center for Health
Statistics’ restricted-use natality file and population counts from the Surveillance, Epi-
demiology, and End Results Program (SEER), we find that a $1,000 increase in per capita
spending would lead to a 4.9% increase in birth rates for women aged 15 to 44. Taking
together with the results on gender-specific labor market outcomes, these results suggest
that a 4.5% increases in men’s employment and 2% increase in men’s wage would in-
crease contemporaneous birth rates by 4.9%, consistent with the contention that children
are “normal.” These estimates are robust to various model specifications and the empirical
strategy passes falsification exercises. Further investigation into the heterogeneous re-
sponses across age groups and racial groups suggests that the effects are larger for females
aged 20 to 34 and Hispanics.
This paper joins a handful of studies that attempted to use exogenous shocks to disen-
tangle the causal link. [88] uses father’s job loss as a potential exogenous shock to house-
hold income and finds that father’s income decreases reduce total fertility, supporting the
3Due to sample restriction, we only investigate the effects on contemporaneous fertility but not completed
fertility. Therefore, it is possible that people would change the timing of fertility but not the total completed
fertility in response to this intervention.
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hypothesis that children are “normal."4 [90] creates gender-specific shift-share indices to
instrument for men’s and women’s labor market opportunity and concludes that improve-
ment in men’s labor market condition has a positive effects on fertility while improvement
in women’s has smaller negative effects on fertility, consistent with the prediction based
on parental time allocation model. [91] uses household wealth shocks generated by the
recent housing boom and bust to investigate the fertility effects of family wealth, and it
shows that increased wealth has a positive effect on fertility. [92] uses the mid-1970s’
increase in world coal prices as an exogenous shock to men’s income in the Appalachian
coal-mining region to investigate how father’s income increases affects fertility, and it
shows that fertility increases with father’s income, suggesting that children are “normal".
[93] exploits variation in the localized “fracking booms" across the U.S. and shows that it
leads to higher wage for non-college-educated men. They then present evidence that the
boom is associated with increased births, consistent with the hypothesis that children are
“normal." 5
The first advantage of our empirical strategy is the transparent and plausibly exoge-
nous variation in men’s labor market conditions. As mentioned earlier, the 2005 BRAC
process aims to improve military efficiency and effectiveness. To achieve this goal, a
BRAC commission was created to conduct an objective and non-partisan review of mili-
tary installations and produce a final, non-amendable recommendation lists. [87] conduct
various falsification exercises to provide strong evidence that the funding decision was
likely driven by military consideration instead of economic concerns. For instance, the
4[89] also uses father’s job loss as a potential exogenous shock to family income to investigate its impact
on the timing of fertility and it concludes that father’s displacement delays first and second births but parents
adjust their fertility in the long run.
5There also exists other empirical work that assesses the relationship between economic condition and
fertility without an apparent source of exogenous variation. For instance, [94]study how fertility responds to
the business cycle and finds that fertility is procyclical. Similarly, [95] uses cohort fixed effects to investigate
the relationship between unemployment and fertility, and they finds that increase in unemployment rate is
associated with a reduction in fertility.
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results remain largely unchanged when commissioners-related states were dropped from
the analysis, lending strong support to the claim. Moreover, empirical evidence shows no
divergence in economic condition between military counties that received funding and mil-
itary counties that did not receive funding. Due to the natural of the program and the fact
that men accounts for approximately 90% of construction employment, this intervention
thus provides a large and potentially exogenous shock to men’s labor market outcomes.
Another advantage of this work is that we explicitly estimate how men’s and women’s
labor market outcomes respond to the 2005 BRAC construction program, and concludes
that men’s employment and wage were affected while women’s were not. Thus, it allows
us to investigate how fertility changes with men’s labor market condition, holding women’s
constant. This is fundamentally different from a scenario in which an economic shock
impacts men more than women. If women also benefit from an exogenous economic
shock, substitution effects are likely to attenuate the income effects assuming that females
are the primary caregiver.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides some background
on the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure. Section 4.3 describes the methodology and
data used to analyze the causal impact of males’ labor market opportunity on fertility.
Section 4.4 presents empirical results of our analyses. Section 4.5 concludes and provides
a discussion of the implications of the results.
4.2 Base Realignment and Closure
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) is a congressionally authorized process that
the Department of Defense has used to reorganize its base structure [72]. Its goal is
to more efficiently and effectively support the armed forces and to enhance operational
readiness. On November 5, 1990, President George H. W. Bush signed the Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, an attempt to isolate political influence from mili-
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tary activity. This act established an independent commission, the Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission, to ensure a timely, independent, and fair process for clos-
ing and realigning U.S. military installations. Since then, there have been four additional
BRACs in 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005. The 2005 BRAC cost around 35 billion dollars,
more than the sum of all previous rounds of BRACs, and 25 billion dollars are dedicated
as construction funding.
On May 13, 2005, the Department of Defense issued the initial recommendation list
for the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure. An independent commission of nine mem-
bers was created to provide an objective and non-partisan review and analysis of that list. It
then produced a final non-amendable recommendation list.6 During this selection process,
the commission followed eight selection criteria and it gave priority to military value.7 To
enhance the impartiality and integrity of the BRAC process, commissioners recused them-
selves from participation in matters related to installations in their home states.8 President
George W. Bush approved the 2005 BRAC commission’s recommendation on Septem-
ber 15, 2005 with a statutory deadline of September 15, 2011. Figure 4.1 presents the
geographic distribution of the average annual per capita construction funding across the
United States. The mean of the average annual per capita funding is roughly $122 for the
funded counties. Almost every state has counties that received construction funding.
Given the decision process, it is likely that the funding awarded to each county was
motivated by military considerations and not local economic conditions. Zheng (2017)
provides convincing evidence to support this hypothesis. Furthermore, since more than
6The 2005 BRAC commission consists of Anthony J. Principi, James H. Bilbray, Philip Coyle, Harold
W. Gehman, Jr., James V. Hansen, T. Hill, Lloyd W. Newton, Samuel K. Skinner, Sue E. Turner.
7See Appendix A.1 for a full list of selection criteria.
8Four commissioners have recused themselves from participation in matters relating to installations in
their home states. Commissioners Coyle and Gehman recused themselves because of their participation in
BRAC-related activity in California and Virginia respectively. Commissioners Bilbray and Hansen recused
themselves because of their long-time representation in the Congress and other public offices of Nevada and
Utah respectively.
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Figure 4.1: Geographic Distribution of Annual BRAC Funding per Capita by County
Source: 2013 Base Realignment and Closure Commission Execution Report
70% of all funding was dedicated as construction funding, and men accounts for approx-
imately 90% of all employment in this industry, the intervention is likely to have larger
impacts on men’s labor market opportunities. Thus, this intervention provides a good
opportunity to examine the theoretical prediction that children are “normal."
4.3 Data and Methodology
4.3.1 Data
The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure construction funding data come from the
2013 Base Realignment and Closure Commission Execution Report. It provides an overview
of the costs and savings for each the Department of Defense Component throughout the
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six-year BRAC implementation period (2006–2011). It also lists detailed annual con-
struction funding information at the installation level. We geocode and aggregate this
information into county-level funding information.
The data on county-level economic activity come from the Longitudinal Employer-
Household Dynamics (LEHD) program’s Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) [96]. The
LEHD data is a massive longitudinal database covering over 95% of U.S. private sector
jobs. It reports on workers covered by the state Unemployment Insurance (UI) program.
Then, several data sources, including the 2000 Census, Social Security Administrative
records, and individual tax return files, are used to collect demographic information about
the worker, such as gender, race and ethnicity. Generated by LEHD’s linked employer-
employee microdata, the QWI provides a wealth of economic statistics at the county level,
including employment and wage, by worker’s gender, race and age. We will use these
data to separately assess the effects of the 2005 BRAC construction program on men’s and
women’s labor market outcomes and test if the intervention has larger effects on men as
predicted.
To estimate the effects of economic condition on fertility, we use restricted-use natal-
ity files from the National Center for Health Statistics from 2002-2013 [97]. These data
consists of a record for each birth that occurred in the United States over this time period.
These data files include information on mother’s age, race and county of residence, which
are used in conjunction with population counts from the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and
End Results Program (SEER) in order to calculate birth rates. We assign births to the year
of conception based on the mothers’ last menstrual period where available; otherwise we
assume a gestation period of nine months.
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics based on these data. Birth rates per thousand
females aged between 15 and 44 averages around 67 across treatment and control counties
over the sample period. Consistent with our intuition, birth rates are higher for females
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Variable N Mean S.D.
Panel A: Outcome Variables
Birth rates per 1,000 females (15-44) 5,450 66 13
Birth rates per 1,000 non-Hispanic white females (15-44) 5,450 62 12
Birth rates per 1,000 black females (15-44) 5,450 72 32
Birth rates per 1,000 Hispanic females (15-44) 5,450 98 33
Birth rates per 1,000 females (15-19) 5,450 43 21
Birth rates per 1,000 females (20-24) 5,450 113 42
Birth rates per 1,000 females (25-29) 5,450 128 23
Birth rates per 1,000 females (30-34) 5,450 91 19
Birth rates per 1,000 females (35-39) 5,450 38 11
Birth rates per 1,000 females (40-44) 5,450 7 3
Panel B: Control Variables
Population 5,450 214,354 32,6572
Percentage of Females 5,450 0.504 0.020
Percentage of Hispanics 5,450 0.093 0.136
Percentage of African Americans 5,450 0.105 0.136
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Note: The sample includes counties receiving the construction funding and counties with at least one military base
reported in 2005 Base Structure Report.
aged 20 to 29, and compared with non-Hispanic whites, blacks and Hispanics have higher
birth rates.
4.3.2 Methodology
To identify the effects of this intervention on fertility, we exploit variation in the tim-
ing and amount of BRAC construction funding across counties. Given the discrete nature
of births and the fact that sometimes county-year cells are zero, especially for subgroup
counts, our preferred specification is to use a Poisson model. While Poisson models are
often used to consider counts instead of rates, we note that this model is equivalent to
estimating the natural log of the expected counts of births while controlling for the cor-
responding population and restricting its coefficient to be equal to one. Specifically, we
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estimate the following model:
E[FRit|perCapitaFundingit, µi, ηt, Xit, δst]
= exp(βperCapitaFundingit + µi + ηt +Xit + δst + uit)
where i indicates counties, t indicates years, and s indicates states. In this model, FRit
measures annual county-level birth rates per thousand females aged 15 to 44; Xit refers to
county-level time-varying demographic controls, including population, percentage of His-
panics, African Americans, and females; and δst represents state-by-year fixed effects.9
The county and year fixed effects are captured by µi and ηt, respectively. The county fixed
effects control for county-level time-invariant characteristics and year fixed effects controls
for nationwide shocks in any year. Moreover, we also include state-by-year fixed effects to
capture state-level shocks in any given year. The inclusion of state-by-year fixed effects al-
lows counties in different states to follow different trajectories and account for differential
shocks by state over time. In this case, the crucial assumption is that in the absence of the
2005 BRAC construction funding, changes in birth rates would have been the same across
all military counties in the same state. The variable of interest is perCapitaFundingit,
which measures 2005 BRAC construction funding at year t in county i. Noted that while
the BRAC report provides data on funding awarded, information on when the funding was
spent is not available. Thus, we assume that all funding received by a county was spent
linearly beginning in the year of receipt. That is, perCapitaFundingit equals zero prior
to the receipt of any funding for county i and equals Fundingit
Populationi,2005
for years after the ini-
tial funding receipt.10 Finally, standard errors are clustered at the state level to allow for
9The county-level demographic data come from the U.S. Census Bureau.
10Each BRAC construction project should be at least 35-percent design complete to request funding from
the Department of Defense, which generates variation in the timing of counties’ first funding receipt. And
Fundingit is defined as TotalFundingi2011−firstyearoffundingreceipt+1i for years after the initial funding receipt. We
use population counts in 2005 to generate the treatment variable because population could be affected by
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arbitrary correlation of the error term at the state level across counties and years.
In reality, counties with military installations are likely to be systematically different
from counties that do not have installations. For this reason, we restrict the sample of
unfunded counties to those with at least one military installation in the 2005 Base Structure
Report, the administrative report on military installations that is published annually by the
Department of Defense.11 We further restrict the overall sample to counties that did not
experience any closure during the 2005 BRAC because closure of bases may have its own
effects on birth rates through mental distress. The sample period is 2002–2011 for the
main analysis. We use 2002 because it is the first year after the completion of the previous
BRAC and 2011 because it is the statutory deadline for completion of the 2005 BRAC.
When we explore treatment effects over time, we extend the sample period through 2013
to investigate whether there are lingering effects.
4.4 Results
In this section, we begin by presenting our results on the general labor market effects
and gender-specific labor market effects to examine if this intervention has a particularly
large effect on men. Then, we proceed to show our main results on fertility. They are
followed by treatment effect dynamic analyses verifying the identifying assumption and
exploring how the effects evolve over time. Finally, we assess the degree to which there
are heterogeneous treatment effects across various racial and age groups.
government spending and 2005 is the last year prior to the BRAC construction program. We make that
assumption for two reasons. First, according to the Department of Defense’s policy, military construction
funding can remain available for up to five years. Second, most installations completed their projects in
2011, even though the Department of Defense distributed most of the funding between 2007 and 2009, and
few counties received funding in 2011 [42].
11We use the 2005 report because it is the last one published prior to the 2005 BRAC.
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4.4.1 Effects on Labor Market Conditions
Tables in this section are organized in the following way: Column 1 shows estimates
from the baseline specification in which we simply control for county and year fixed ef-
fects. Column 2 further adds county-level time-varying demographic controls to the model
to test if the estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of additional controls. Column 3
present estimates from a specification in which we control for county, year and state-by-
year fixed effects. The inclusion of state-by-year fixed effects controls for statewide shocks
that are common to counties in the same state at the same year, which further relaxes the
identifying assumption. And Column 4 controls for all these fixed effects and time-varying
characteristics.
Table 4.2 presents our results on the general labor market effects with Panel A show-
ing the estimated effects on employment and Panel B on average monthly wage. Estimates
from this analysis suggest that this intervention has a significant effect on overall employ-
ment and average monthly wage, with our preferred specification in Column 4 indicating
that a $1,000 increase in annual per capita BRAC construction funding would increase
employment by 3.4% and increase average monthly wage by 1.4%.12
While the analysis on overall employment and wage indicates a significant positive
effect, the sign of the fertility effects depends on whether income effects or substitu-
tion effects dominate. Assuming that females are the primary caregiver, improvement
in women’s employment and wage would lead to a decrease in fertility because the price
of having an additional child is likely to outweigh the income effects. But if the labor mar-
ket effects fall mostly on men, the income effects would dominate the substitution effects
and we would expect to observe an increase in fertility. Thus, in Table 4.3, we present
estimates that separately investigate the effects of the 2005 BRAC intervention by gender.
12These estimates are comparable in magnitude to what Zheng (2017) calculated based on the Bureau of
Economic Analysis’ Regional Economic Information System dataset.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Log(Employment)
Annual BRAC Funding per Capita 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.031** 0.034***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011)
N 21,333 21,013 21,333 21,013
Panel B: Log(Average Monthly Earning)
Annual BRAC Funding per Capita 0.019** 0.018* 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004)
N 21,281 20,961 21,281 20,961
Controls No Yes No Yes
State-by-Year Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes
Table 4.2: Estimated Effects of 2005 BRAC Construction Funding on Labor Market Out-
comes
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Data are from Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics. All regressions
include county, year and quarter fixed effects. Control variables include population, percentage of female, percentage
of African Americans and percentage of Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Panel A of Table 4.3 presents the effects on men and Panel B presents the effects on
women. Given the nature of the intervention and the fact that over 90% of construction
workers are men, ex ante, this program is likely to have larger effects on men’s labor
market outcomes. And results from Table 4.3 are consistent with this hypothesis. Results
based on our preferred specification in Column 4 shows that an additional $1,000 increase
in annual per capita BRAC construction funding would increase employment by 4.5% and
wage by 1.8% for men. However, there is no evidence that this intervention has an effect
on women.
To sum up, results from these analyses indicate that the 2005 BRAC construction pro-
gram has significant effects on average wage and employment for funded military counties.
In particular, it has large effect on men but no effects on women. Based on the parental
time allocation model, we would expect to observe an increase in fertility assuming that
children are “normal" and burden of child-raising mostly fall on women. We will explore
this issue in the next section.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Male
Panel A1: Log(Employment)
Annual BRAC Funding per Capita 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.043*** 0.045***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
Panel A2: Log(Average Monthly Earning)
Annual BRAC Funding per Capita 0.024** 0.023** 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004)
Panel B: Female
Panel B1: Log(Employment)
Annual BRAC Funding per Capita 0.019 0.023* 0.018 0.022
(0.016) (0.013) (0.018) (0.017)
Panel B2: Log(Average Monthly Earning)
Annual BRAC Funding per Capita 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Controls No Yes No Yes
State-by-Year Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes
Table 4.3: Estimated Effects of 2005 BRAC Construction Funding on Labor Market Out-
comes by Gender
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Data are from Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics. All regressions
include county, year and quarter fixed effects. Control variables include population, percentage of female, percentage
of African Americans and percentage of Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
4.4.2 Main Results on Fertility
Before presents our empirical results, we would like to highlight how this intervention
differs from others and its implication on estimated results. As shown in previous section,
the 2005 BRAC construction program generates a natural experiment in which a plausibly
exogenous shock impacts men’s employment and wage, but not women’s. Therefore, this
program provides an opportunity for us to investigate how fertility changes with men’s
employment and wage, holding women’s constant. This is essentially difficult from an
experiment that affects men more than women. Assuming that women are the primary
caregiver for children, in the latter case, substitution effects from women’s employment
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Birth Rate per 1,000) (Mean: 67 S.D.:13)
Annual BRAC Funding per Capita 0.059*** 0.052*** 0.060*** 0.049***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009)
N 5,450 5,450 5,450 5,450
Controls No Yes No Yes
State-by-Year Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes
Table 4.4: Estimated Effects of 2005 BRAC Construction Funding on Fertility
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Control variables
include population, percentage of female, percentage of African Americans and percentage of Hispanics. Standard
errors are clustered at the state level.
and wage increases are more likely to attenuate the income effects.
Table 4.4 presents the main results on fertility. Column 1 shows estimates from the
baseline specification in which we control for county and year fixed effects. Estimates
from this specification suggest that an additional $1,000 increases in per capita BRAC
construction funding would increase birth rates by 5.9%. Column 2 further adds a rich set
of time-varying demographic controls to the model, including population, percentage of
females, blacks and Hispanics. Results from this specification largely unchanged, suggest-
ing that there is little scope for omitted variables bias. In Column 3, we present estimates
from a specification in which we control for county, year and state-by-year fixed effects in
order to address the potential concern that counties in different states may follow different
trajectories and there could be state-level policies that impacts fertility during the sample
period. Adding state-by-year fixed effects, in this case, would control for statewide shocks
to fertility that are common to counties in the same state at the same year. Estimates based
on this specification remain similar to the previous results. Finally, our preferred speci-
fication in Column 4 controls for all these fixed effects and time-varying characteristics,
and the results suggests that a $1,000 increase in annual per capita BRAC construction
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funding would increase fertility by 4.9%. To put these results into context, it suggest that
a 4.5% increase in men’s employment and 1.8% increase in men’s wage would lead to a
4.9% increases in birth rates.
As an additional way to estimate the effects of this program on fertility, we investigate
the dynamic responses of birth rates to 2005 BRAC construction funding. We progres-
sively make changes to the models to investigate how the effects evolve over time and
verify that birth rates in military counties that received funding did not diverge from un-
funded military counties in the same state. Column 1 of Table 4.5 presents estimates from
the specification that we control for county, year and state-by-year fixed effects. Estimates
from this column indicate that larger effects in the short run, and the effects disappear once
the funding is discontinued after 2011. In Column 2, we further add county level time-
varying demographic controls to the model. Estimates from this model remain similar to
those in Column 1. Column 3 and Column 4 separately adds one- and two-year leads to the
specifications to check if birth rates in funded military counties tracks the trends of birth
rates in unfunded military counties in the same state, which otherwise would cast doubt on
the identifying assumption. Estimates on the lead terms are close to zero and never statis-
tically significant, providing strong support to the identification strategy. Furthermore, the
estimated effects of 2005 BRAC construction funding are robust to the inclusion of those
leads, lending further support to the research design.
4.4.3 Heterogeneous Effects
In this section, we explore the degree to which there are heterogeneous treatment ef-
fects across different demographic groups to help capture a better picture of the effects.
First, we will examine the heterogeneous effects across racial groups and then across age
groups.
Summary statistics in Table 4.1 suggests that birth rates differ by racial groups. Thus,
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Birth Rate per 1,000) (Mean: 67 S.D.:13)
Effects of BRAC Funding in the First Year 0.068*** 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.047***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016)
Effects of BRAC Funding in the Second Year 0.097*** 0.086*** 0.089*** 0.076***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.019)
Effects of BRAC Funding in the Third Year 0.058*** 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.036**
(0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Effects of BRAC Funding in the Fourth Year 0.092*** 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.068***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017)
Effects of BRAC Funding in the Fifth Year 0.007 -0.003 -0.000 -0.013
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Effects of BRAC Funding After Fifth Year 0.024* -0.003 -0.001 -0.013
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
One Year Before the Initial BRAC Receipt 0.010 -0.002
(0.017) (0.014)
Two Years Before the Initial BRAC Receipt -0.041
(0.032)
N 6,516 6,516 6,516 6,516
Controls No Yes Yes No
State-by-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 4.5: Estimated Effects of 2005 BRAC Construction Funding on Childbearing, Lags
and Leads
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Control variables
include population, percentage of female, percentage of African Americans and percentage of Hispanics. Standard
errors are clustered at the state level.
it is also possible that various racial group would respond differently towards the 2005
BRAC economic shock. In Table 4.6, we present results that separately estimate the ef-
fects for non-Hispanic whites, blacks and Hispanics. Panel A presents the effects on non-
Hispanic white and shows that an additional thousand per capita BRAC spending would
increase fertility for this group by approximately 4.6%. Panel B presents the results for
Blacks, and while the estimates are less robust to alternative specification as compared
with the ones for non-Hispanic whites, the magnitude of the estimates for this group are
uniformly larger. Panel C presents the results for Hispanics. It appears that the fertility
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: ln(Non-Hispanic White Birth Rate per 1,000) (Mean: 62 S.D.:12)
Annual BRAC Funding per Capita 0.039*** 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.046***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
N 5,450 5,450 5,450 5,450
Panel B: ln(Black Birth Rate per 1,000) (Mean: 72 S.D.:32)
Annual BRAC Funding per Capita 0.150*** 0.104*** 0.112*** 0.077***
(0.038) (0.036) (0.028) (0.026)
N 5,450 5,450 5,450 5,450
Panel C: ln(Hispanic Birth Rate per 1,000) (Mean: 98 S.D.:33)
Annual BRAC Funding per Capita 0.150*** 0.125*** 0.121*** 0.083**
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.033)
N 5,450 5,450 5,450 5,450
Controls No Yes No Yes
State-by-Year Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes
Table 4.6: Estimated Effects of 2005 BRAC Construction Funding on Fertility by Racial
Groups
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Control variables
include population, percentage of female, percentage of African Americans and percentage of Hispanics. Standard
errors are clustered at the state level.
effects for this group are the largest among all three, which is consistent with our intuition
because approximately 30% of construction employment are Hispanics while they only
constitute less than 20% of the total population. Based on these results, we conclude that
the fertility effects are larger for blacks and Hispanics while the magnitude of the overall
effects are similar to the effects on non-Hispanic white as they account for approximately
80% of the total population.
Table 4.7 presents the effects by age groups. Ex ante, since teen births are less likely
to be affected by household financial conditions, we should expect to see smaller effects
on this age group. And results from Panel A in Table 6 is consistent with the intuition and
there are little effects on teen birth rates. On the other hand, We find large and consistent
effects for females aged 20 to 34.
In conclusion, results from this panel indicate that there are heterogeneous responses
across racial groups and the effects are larger for blacks and Hispanics. Similarly, while
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: 15-19 (Mean: 43 S.D.:21)
Annual BRAC Funding per Capita 0.011 0.014 0.003 0.001
(0.029) (0.030) (0.024) (0.025)
Panel B: 20-24 (Mean: 113 S.D.:42)
Annual BRAC Funding per Capita 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.109** 0.105**
(0.034) (0.034) (0.041) (0.041)
Panel C: 25-29 (Mean: 128 S.D.:23)
Annual BRAC Funding per Capita 0.146*** 0.141*** 0.139*** 0.131***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.025) (0.024)
Panel D: 30-34 (Mean: 91 S.D.:19)
Annual BRAC Funding per Capita 0.089*** 0.086*** 0.084*** 0.079***
(0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Panel E: 35-39 (Mean: 38 S.D.:11)
Annual BRAC Funding per Capita 0.029 0.026 0.030 0.026
(0.035) (0.036) (0.039) (0.041)
Panel F: 40-44 (Mean: 7 S.D.:3)
Annual BRAC Funding per Capita -0.074* -0.085** -0.070 -0.077*
(0.043) (0.040) (0.044) (0.041)
Controls No Yes No Yes
State-by-Year Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes
Table 4.7: Estimated Effects of 2005 BRAC Construction Funding on Fertility by Mother’s
Age Groups
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Control variables
include population, percentage of female, percentage of African Americans and percentage of Hispanics. Standard
errors are clustered at the state level.
teen births and female over 35 are unaffected by the intervention, females aged 20 to 34
are responsible for the overall effects.
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we use a potentially exogenous shock to localized economic condition,
especially men’s labor market condition, to test the parental time allocation model. Specif-
ically, we exploit variation across counties in the timing and amount of construction fund-
ing provided by the 2005 BRAC to show that this program has a large effects on men’s
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labor market opportunity but not women’s. Then, we use the same variation to test the
theoretical prediction that father’s labor market outcomes have a positive effect on fertil-
ity. Our analyses indicates that a 4.5% increase in men’s employment and 1.8% increase
in income would lead to a 4.9% increase in contemporaneous fertility, which is consis-
tent with theoretical prediction. Furthermore, we investigate the extent to which there are
heterogeneous treatment effects across various demographic groups and conclude that the
effects are mostly driven females aged 20 to 34.
Noted that [87] finds significant effects of the 2005 BRAC construction program on
in-migration, it is possible that the fertility effects are driven by migrants. In this case,
compositional changes in population may be responsible for the observed increases in
fertility. However, as shown in [87], an $1,000 increase in per capita BRAC spending is
associated with an additional 1,000 migrants, and they are unlikely to have increased birth
rates by 4.9% for counties averaging around 200,000 people. Thus, it does not seem that
migrants are driving the observed effects.
This paper complements a growing body of empirical literatures that try to disentangle
the causal link between parental labor market condition and fertility. Specifically, it adds to
this line of literature by estimating a recent potentially exogenous shock that affect men’s
labor market condition on fertility. And we find evidence that father’s improved labor mar-
ket condition has large and consistent effects on fertility. Understanding the causal link
between parental income shocks and fertility have important policy implications as society
may have a targeted or optimal birth rates. The positive relationship between men’s labor
market opportunity and fertility suggests that programs aiming at improving labor market
condition for men may have unintended fertility effects. However, the results should be
interpreted with caution for policy implications. Our results indicate a contemporaneous
fertility increase following improved labor market conditions for men and provide some
evidence of an increase in completed fertility during the sample period, but it is possi-
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ble that these shocks have no effects on total completed fertility in the long run if people
simply change the timing of fertility. Therefore, further research to investigate long run
effects of this intervention would be warranted to policies that aim to increase total com-
pleted fertility.
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5. CONCLUSION
This dissertation applies causal inference method to study how policies affect the gen-
eral welfare of the public; whether intentionally or unintentionally.
In the first essay, I employ a difference-in-differences design to reexamine the effect
of false ID laws with scanner provisions on underage drinking using 1991–2013 national
Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System data. In contrast to previous findings based
on the NLSY97, the results using these data indicate that these laws have no effect on
reducing underage drinking behavior, and that conclusion is robust under various model
specifications. Estimates allowing for dynamic treatment effects lead to the same conclu-
sion. Moreover, a replication and extension of prior work using the NLSY97 suggests that
previously reported estimates based on those data are not reliable. As a whole, my analy-
ses suggest that a stricter false ID law with enforced use of electronic scanners in alcohol
sales is not an effective approach to reducing underage drinking.
In the second essay, I exploit variation across counties in the timing and amount of
construction funding provided by the 2005 BRAC to estimate the effects of government
spending on local economic conditions. My analysis yields an estimated cost per job of
approximately $65,000 and a local fiscal multiplier of around 1.21, and these estimates are
robust to various model specifications. Furthermore, an industry-specific analysis finds es-
pecially large effects on the construction industry, which is consistent with the nature of the
spending. To better understand the regional impact of the BRAC funding, I directly esti-
mate spillover effects on neighboring counties. I find little evidence of spillovers; however,
there is suggestive evidence of positive spillovers on construction employment for neigh-
boring counties. This paper suggests that government spending, especially construction
spending, could play a significant role in creating jobs and increasing income.
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In the third essay, we used a potentially exogenous shock to localized economic con-
dition, especially men’s labor market condition, to test the parental time allocation model.
Specifically, we exploit variation across counties in the timing and amount of construc-
tion funding provided by the 2005 BRAC to show that this program has a large effects on
men’s labor market opportunity but not women’s. Then, we use the same variation to test
the theoretical prediction that father’s labor market outcomes have a positive effect on fer-
tility. Our analyses indicates that a 4.5% increase in men’s employment and 1.8% increase
in income would lead to a 4.9% increase in contemporaneous fertility, which is consis-
tent with theoretical prediction. Furthermore, we investigate the extent to which there are
heterogeneous treatment effects across various demographic groups and conclude that the
effects are mostly driven females aged 20 to 34. This paper provides strong evidence that
children are “normal” and that policies aiming at improving men’s labor market outcomes
would increase fertility, at least in the short-run.
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APPENDIX A
2005 BASE REAGLINMENT AND CLOSURE SELECTION CRITERIA
In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of De-
fense, giving priority consideration to military values, the first four criteria listed below,
will consider:
Military Value
1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness
of total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting,
training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including
training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity
of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland
defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force
requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and
training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.
Other Considerations
5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years,
beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to
exceed the costs.
6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installa-
tions.
7. The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving commu-
85
nities to support forces, missions, and personnel.
8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential envi-
ronmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities.
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APPENDIX B
FIGURES
If Consumed Alcohol If Binge Drank
Days of Alcohol Consumption Days of Binge Drinking
Figure B.1: Sensitivity Analysis of Estimates to Treated States Considered
Notes: Sample is 1991–2013 YRBS surveys. These figures plot the coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence
interval against ranking of the coefficient estimates. These estimates are from models with state and year fixed
effects, controls and state-specific linear time trends, dropping 1, 2 or 3 treatment states in the analysis. Standard
errors are clustered at the state level. Estimates unweighted.
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APPENDIX C
TABLES
State Law Effective Date
Arizona 8/12/2005
Connecticut 10/1/2001
Nebraska 7/15/2010
New York 9/1/1999
North Carolina 11/14/2001
Ohio 9/21/2000
Oregon 1/1/2000
Pennsylvania 12/16/2002
Texas 9/1/2005
Utah 7/1/2009
West Virginia 6/6/2003
Table C.1: Law Effective Dates of False ID Laws with Scanner Provisions
Source: Alcohol Policy Information System (APIS)
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Full Sample Male Female
Panel A: If Consumed Alcohol
FSP Laws -0.027 -0.041 -0.006
(0.023) (0.038) (0.024)
N 155,480 76,026 79,454
Panel B: If Binge Drank
FSP Laws -0.011 -0.015 0.000
(0.023) (0.033) (0.022)
N 162,585 79,713 82,872
Panel C: Days of Alcohol Consumption
FSP Laws -0.114 -0.181 0.010
(0.222) (0.294) (0.227)
N 155,480 76,026 79,454
Panel D: Days of Binge Drinking
FSP Laws -0.090 -0.121 -0.020
(0.191) (0.246) (0.189)
N 162,585 79,713 82,872
Table C.2: Weighted Least Square Estimates of FSP Laws on Underage Drinking
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Sample is 1991–2013 YRBS survey. All regressions include state and
year fixed effects, individual- and state-level controls, lead term and state-specific linear time trend. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level. Individual-level controls include gender, race and age. State-level controls include
unemployment rate, log of income per capita, state beer tax per gallon, and dummy variables controlling for various
state policies on youth alcohol access. Estimates weighted by survey weights.
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If Binge Drank Days of Alcohol Consumption Days of Binge Drinking Average Drinks per Day
Panel A
4+ years before 0.033 0.022 0.159 0.053
(0.030) (0.227) (0.198) (0.104)
3 years before 0.006 0.102 0.010 0.043
(0.023) (0.148) (0.180) (0.074)
2 years before -0.003 -0.072 -0.250 -0.050
(0.022) (0.142) (0.197) (0.071)
1 year before (omitted)
1 year after 0.002 0.148 0.032 -0.021
(0.017) (0.201) (0.107) (0.057)
2 years after 0.013 0.183 0.130 0.035
(0.015) (0.334) (0.118) (0.085)
3 years after 0.005 0.432 0.145 0.091
(0.031) (0.289) (0.164) (0.092)
4+ years after 0.031 0.821 0.291 0.161
(0.030) (0.702) (0.298) (0.147)
N 40,004 40,070 40,004 39,790
Panel B
4+ years before 0.035*** 0.094 0.409*** 0.103
(0.012) (0.171) (0.087) (0.063)
3 years before 0.008 0.161* 0.215*** 0.084**
(0.009) (0.088) (0.056) (0.038)
1-2 years before (omitted)
1 year after 0.002 0.148 0.032 -0.021
(0.017) (0.201) (0.105) (0.057)
2 years after 0.013 0.169 0.083 0.026
(0.014) (0.322) (0.090) (0.078)
3 years after 0.004 0.406 0.055 0.073
(0.027) (0.280) (0.123) (0.078)
4+ years after 0.029 0.782 0.154 0.134
(0.025) (0.676) (0.221) (0.127)
N 40,004 40,070 40,004 39,790
Table C.3: Attempted Replication and Extension of [1]’s Dynamic Analysis
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include state, year and month fixed effects, controls and
state-specific linear time trends. Individual-level controls include age, gender, race, family size, income, marital
status, employment status, educational attainment and being a student. State-level controls include unemployment
rate, log of income per capita, state beer tax per gallon, and dummy variables controlling for various state policies
on youth alcohol access. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Data are from 1998–2005 NLSY97 sample.
Estimates unweighted.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Days of Alcohol Consumption, Original Responses
FSP Laws -0.168* -0.156* -0.357*** -0.269** -0.208* -0.266** -0.441*** -0.398***
(0.093) (0.087) (0.088) (0.103) (0.121) (0.116) (0.118) (0.116)
1-2 Years Prior to FSP laws -0.364*** -0.396*** -0.322*** -0.396***
(0.079) (0.106) (0.083) (0.099)
N 40,164 40,070 40,070 40,070 40,164 40,070 40,070 40,070
R2 0.026 0.084 0.084 0.085 0.054 0.065 0.065 0.068
Panel B: Days of Alcohol Consumption: Variables Recoded
FSP Laws -0.177* -0.160* -0.365*** -0.261** -0.203 -0.251* -0.427*** -0.376***
(0.097) (0.094) (0.105) (0.100) (0.136) (0.129) (0.131) (0.113)
1-2 Years Prior to FSP laws -0.372*** -0.400*** -0.322*** -0.407***
(0.094) (0.124) (0.099) (0.121)
N 40,164 40,070 40,070 40,070 40,164 40,070 40,070 40,070
R2 0.025 0.084 0.084 0.085 0.054 0.064 0.064 0.067
Panel C: Days of Binge Drinking, Original Responses
FSP Laws -0.125 -0.111 -0.251*** -0.082 -0.136* -0.158** -0.272*** -0.151*
(0.091) (0.071) (0.087) (0.101) (0.073) (0.077) (0.092) (0.077)
1-2 Years Prior to FSP laws -0.254*** -0.199*** -0.209*** -0.202***
(0.054) (0.065) (0.046) (0.038)
N 40,097 40,004 40,004 40,004 40,097 40,004 40,004 40,004
R2 0.020 0.071 0.071 0.073 0.037 0.044 0.045 0.048
Panel D: Days of Binge Drinking: Variables Recoded
FSP Laws -0.118 -0.106 -0.252*** -0.077 -0.125 -0.157* -0.270*** -0.156
(0.099) (0.075) (0.092) (0.117) (0.077) (0.080) (0.098) (0.096)
1-2 Years Prior to FSP laws -0.264*** -0.202** -0.208*** -0.203***
(0.072) (0.081) (0.066) (0.061)
N 40,097 40,004 40,004 40,004 40,097 40,004 40,004 40,004
R2 0.020 0.069 0.069 0.071 0.035 0.043 0.043 0.046
Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
1–2 Years Prior to FSP Laws No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
State-specific Linear Time Trends No No No Yes No No No Yes
Individual Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table C.4: Estimated Effects on Underage Drinking, Adding Measurement Errors to
NLSY97 to Be Comparable to YRBS
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include state, year and month fixed effects. Individual-level
controls include age, gender, race, family size, income, marital status, employment status, educational attainment and
being a student. State-level controls include unemployment rate, log of income per capita, state beer tax per gallon,
and dummy variables controlling for various state policies on youth alcohol access. Standard errors are clustered at
the state level. Data are from 1998–2005 NLSY97 sample. Estimates unweighted.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Log(Employment)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.030* 0.033**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.017) (0.014)
N 5,370 5,370 5,370 5,370
Panel B: Log(Per Capita Income)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.058*** 0.058***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.021) (0.018)
N 5,370 5,370 5,370 5,370
Cost per Job 56,007 50,543 69,075 62,796
Income Multiplier 2.33 2.36 1.85 1.85
Controls No Yes No Yes
State-by-Year Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes
Table C.5: Estimated Effects of 2005 BRAC Construction Funding on Local Economic
Conditions: Alternative Construction of per Capita Funding
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include county and year fixed effects. County-level controls
include population, percentage of female, Hispanics and African Americans. Standard errors are clustered at the
state level. Control counties are counties with at least one military base reported in base structural report in 2005,
the last report published prior to the 2005 BRAC. Estimates are unweighted. perCapitaFundingit equals to zero
prior to the receipt of any funding for county i and equals to Fundingit
Populationit
for years after the first year of funding
receipt. The cost per job is calculated as $1,000×pre-funding average of population size for funded countiesestimated percentage change×pre-funding average of employment for funded counties and the
local fiscal multiplier is calculated as estimated percentage change×pre-funding average of per capita income for funded counties
$1,000
.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Log(Employment)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.028** 0.031***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008)
N 5,370 5,370 5,370 5,370
Panel B: Log(Per Capita Income)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.042*** 0.038** 0.036*** 0.031***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010)
N 5,370 5,370 5,370 5,370
Cost per Job 62,795 60,949 74,009 66,847
Income Multiplier 1.34 1.21 1.15 0.99
Controls No Yes No Yes
State-by-Year Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes
Table C.6: Estimated Effects of 2005 BRAC Construction Funding on Local Economic
Conditions: Alternative Assumption on Spending Pattern
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include county and year fixed effects. County-level con-
trols include population, percentage of female, Hispanics and African Americans. Standard errors are clustered
at the state level. Control counties are counties with at least one military base reported in base structural report
in 2005, the last report published prior to the 2005 BRAC. Estimates are unweighted. Assume each individual
funding awarded to a county at a given year is spent equally between that year and 2011. For instance, County
A receive M million dollars in 2008 and N million dollars in 2010, so the spending for County A would be M
4
million dollars in 2008 and 2009, and M
4
+ N
2
million dollars in 2010 and 2011. The cost per job is calculated
as $1,000×pre-funding average of population size for funded countiesestimated percentage change×pre-funding average of employment for funded counties and the local fiscal multiplier is calculated as
estimated percentage change×pre-funding average of per capita income for funded counties
$1,000
.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Log(Average Wage)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.054*** 0.052***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
N 5,370 5,370 5,370 5,370
Panel B: Log(Unemployment Rate)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) -0.047* -0.049** -0.005 -0.008
(0.025) (0.023) (0.010) (0.010)
N 63,745 62,809 63,745 62,809
Panel C: Log(Population)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.013 0.014 0.012 0.017
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023)
N 5,370 5,370 5,370 5,370
Panel C: Log(Average Monthly Employment)
BRAC Funding per Capita ($1,000s) 0.040*** 0.045*** 0.034*** 0.039***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009)
N 21,255 20,943 21,255 20,943
Controls No Yes No Yes
State-by-Year Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes
Table C.7: Estimated Effects of 2005 BRAC Construction Funding on Other Measures of
Local Economic Conditions
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . Information on average wage and population are taken from BEA’s REIS.
Data on unemployment rate are from BLS. Control variables include population, percentage of female, percentage
of African Americans and percentage of Hispanics. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Estimates are
unweighted.
94
